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Abstract  
 
In this paper, a theory of accounting, control and accounting-related areas is outlined. It is a 
general approach to financial control for all types of organisations. It is based on a number of 
previous research-oriented books published over several decades and the author´s specific 
own experiences from internal and external processes with organisations in focus. 
Consistency and integrative power of the ideas have been tested in relation to certain books 
in various fields outside the core of the subject: theatre, sociology, applied systems theory, 
economic history, institutional theory and economics. The general approach can be described 
in simple terms as follows. There are global value chains, from resources to output that are in 
use. These chains change with time. Uncertainty and unpredictability prevail for the present 
state and for possible changes; to some extent it is possible to estimate risks of the future. At 
any moment, each organisation has taken some limited position on a chain. Each 
organisation has a hierarchy which lies above operations. Over time, chains, organisations, 
hierarchies, output and personal functions vary. According to the approach, insights into 
control problems for every organisation and system can be gained by analysing relationships 
between global value chains and a hierarchy of one or several organisations. Time is crucial.  
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Many fields of the social sciences have their special approach to control problems and are, in 
this sense, intentionally fragmented. As a matter of fact, limitations and focuses within 
defined boundaries are often regarded as research virtues. Specialisation has increased. With 
a systems-theory view on real-world problems, it seems quite obvious that each field 
represents both deep insight and “disciplinary hubris”.
1  
Also, various accounting-related fields are partial fragments. Basically, financial 
accounting is one subject and management accounting and control is another. Managing and 
controlling market-based companies is studied as one issue, public administration is regarded 
as something else. Most research studies are restricted to a very limited problem. Partly as an 
effect of this, there is a tendency to describe governance instruments and processes 
separately without relating them materially to the world they affect.
2 Researchers argue for 
certain specific concepts and objectives within a theoretical framework and let other 
considerations stay outside the theory and become part of the use. This is a well-known 
phenomenon that has become more and more important over the years.
3 
Often some important views are imbedded in the very limitations of a practical issue or 
research design. Furthermore, only certain aspects are considered – I call this partitioning. 
The wider the perspective, the more difficult it is to reach a firm conclusion about the design 
of control systems or the interpretation of a control problem. Purely logical inferences 
require a view on partly philosophical issues: the relationship between means of control and 
activities to be considered, the relationship between the interests of different groups of 
people, the relevance of various expressions of human needs that an organisation is to 
satisfy, the organisations’ way of working in that perspective. It is difficult, or even 
impossible, to get a solid philosophical basis for the construction or evaluation of control 
systems. The fundamental problems have been discussed at least since Plato and Aristotle, 
without any remarkable success. What deserves to be described as answers on scientific 
grounds, ought to reflect an awareness of these premises. 
                                                            
1 The term is quoted from Holding, C.S., Gunderson Lance H. & Ludwig, Donald, In Quest of a Theory of 
Adaptive Change, chapter 1 in Panarchy. Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. 
According to them, fields like economics, ecology and institutional theory represent “partial truths”. They 
claim, for example, that economics concerns mostly fast moving variables and underestimates organisational 
patterns, that ecologists largely ignore institutional arrangements and that institutional theory considers such 
features largely in a static sense. 
2See, for example, Scapens, Robert W. & Bromwich, Michael, Management Accounting Research: the 
first decade, Shields, Michael D., Research in Management Accounting by North Americans in the 1990s, 
and Beattie, Vivien, Moving the financial accounting research front forward: the UK contribution.  
3 See, for example, Watts, Ross L & Zimmerman, Jerold L., Positive Accounting Theory, chapter 1, for a 
general discussion in the 1980s about this phenomenon. Nevertheless, research conclusions may be far-
reaching despite narrow frameworks. For example, in a research contribution, Financial Reporting 
Transparency, Mary E. Barth and Katherine Schipper define and promote the concept of transparency with 
only a very limited contextual analysis.  
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Theory-building should include approaches whereby problem descriptions have a broader 
coverage and cross the borders of traditional specialisations. This is true of control-oriented 
social sciences in general, and the accounting-related fields are no exceptions. Dependencies 
between economic activities and between individuals shape basic control problems and it is 
often more crucial to attack them than to find solutions within each narrow frame. 
Connectedness in all respects has increased. Larger sets of related activities take place in 
larger spatial areas. Partitioning is also common in academic inquiries. Often, researchers are 
inclined to emphasize certain aspects of a complex problem without having a broad 
perspective on events. This may cause inconveniences when the underlying reality, but not 
the theoretical models, consists of connected phenomena.
4  
Accounting and control tools need to be discussed as devices that have many effects, 
observable or not, in broad and not well-defined contexts that comprise multiple areas of 
significance. One step in this direction is to gain an understanding of the issues of each 
traditional subfield in more general terms. To what extent are accounting and control 
problems within, for example, public and private sectors reflections of more general 
problems with more fundamental roots and to what extent are they exclusive for each 
subfield? An understanding at this level will be integrative and facilitate connections with 
abstract descriptions in other fields. Besides, in order to deal with more limited problems, it 
is important to recognize to what extent a phenomenon is specific for a certain organisation 
or with whom it is shared. 
I intend to outline a theoretical approach of accounting, control and accounting-related 
areas – that is, of financial control – with the above as a background. My discussion is based 
on a number of previous research-oriented books published over several decades – mostly in 
Swedish
5 – and my own specific experiences of internal and external processes with 
organisations in focus over the same period.
6 I have tested the consistency and integrative 
power of my ideas in relation to books in various fields outside the core of my subject: 
theatre, sociology, applied systems theory, economic history, institutional theory and 
economics.
7 I have also developed additional ideas through these works. 
 
                                                            
4 This discussion is in line with Holding, C.S., Gunderson, Lance H. & Ludwig, Donald, In Quest of a Theory 
of Adaptive Change. Their discussion on systems properties and “partial truths” includes the pronounced need 
of a worldview “that overcomes disconnects due to limitations of each field.”     
5 Two works in English are Johansson, Sven-Erik & Östman, Lars, Accounting Theory – Integrating Behaviour 
and Measurement, 1995, and Östman, Lars, The long range dynamics of financial control. The Royal Dramatic 
Theatre and its costs over a century, SSE Working Paper Series in Business Administration, 2007:001.    
6 Some main concepts and ideas of this text are clearly connected to my experiences of practical problem- 
solving in actual cases. A set of systems criteria that are described below was developed when I was confronted 
with a complicated management control design decision in a metal-work company in the mid-1970s. Around 
1990, I used the concepts of vertical and horizontal control processes in order to understand control 
mechanisms in an energy company. In this text, they express the basic structure. Many years later, I analysed 
the changed conditions of a traditional insurance company. I developed ideas that are described below about the 
relationship between profit-oriented and non-profit organisations.        
7 The most influential sources are Hayman, Ronald, How to read a play, ideas in linguistics and semiotics, 
Gunderson Lance H. & Holding, C.S., eds., Panarchy. Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural 
Systems, Habermas, Jürgen, The theory of communicative action, Ferguson, Niall, The Ascent of Money: A 
Financial History of the World and Baumol, William J. & Bowen, William G., Performing arts – the economic 





I have two fundamental logical prerequisites: first, each individual has his or her unique life 
– conditioned by biological and physical circumstances – and the possibilities of and 
interests in satisfying personal and family functions are varied and vary over time; and 
second, the earth is a unique and common settlement for human beings – conditioned by 
biological and physical factors that operate primarily irrespective of what views people may 
have on them.  
To a large extent, the economic system as a whole is self-organising. However, there are 
many organisations with a range of roles.
8 Every alternative that is carried out by an 
organisation may be related to the basic premises for personal functions and the global 
system, naturally most often vaguely and at a very remote distance. Dependencies and 
independencies between economic activities and between human beings are my analytical 
starting points: whether two phenomena or two subjects affect each other. These terms may 
have positive or negative connotations, but I refer only to relationships as such. In principle, 
dependencies on natural systems are also included. However, it is difficult, or even 
impossible, to survey many of these relationships in the short and the long term.  
How, and to what extent, does a single human being affect his or her situation within 
these frames? Each individual has his/her own view of the dependence on highest powers of 
a spiritual or worldly nature, and such ideas have varied between epochs and between 
outlooks on life. Dependence can be tied to gods or saints, fate, royal power or various social 
organisations with different degrees of people´s influence. Some people emphasize that 
human beings basically stand alone or together with a few fellows, others recognize more of 
a dependence on the highest powers of various kinds. 
However, organisations are strong driving forces.
9 Financial impulses from the outside 
and internal methods to maintain economic control are decisive for their actions. I have an 
instrumental view of organisations and of the constructions of financial control tools for 
organisations in a society. Instrumentality concerns the effects of tools on certain functions. 
Ultimately, the personal functions of human beings, present and future, constitute the 
fundamental reference point in a theory of financial control. As a key intermediate step, 
existing and possible functions of financial tools for organisations are most essential. 
Payments, financial instruments, accounting, control models, economic calculations, and 
related considerations – within and outside an organisation – should be discussed with regard 
to inner characteristics but also possible effects. From a financial control point of view, 
identifying relationships between activities and financial processes is a general and basic 
issue. How are the financial limits for activities set? What are the consequences? 
I regard instrumentality as an inevitable and necessary guide line for any control system 
that relates resources to functions and visions. Thus, philosophically I have a pragmatic view 




8 In his book The Self-Organizing Economy, Paul Krugman discusses characteristics of economic systems but, 
like most other economists in their analyses, he does not at all mention organisations as phenomena. .  
9 For a review of  the re-emergence of the institutional perspective on economic systems problems in the late 
20
th century, see, for example, the introduction to Groenewegen, John, Pitelis, Christos & Sjöstrand, Sven-Erik, 




10 What happens in economic systems provides not only material conditions for 
people´s lives but also has many deep repercussions in social and other dimensions in 
“lifeworlds” that have another rationality. When financial control instruments are introduced, 
the economic system is primarily affected, but dependencies for individuals in a wide sense 
are also affected, and therefore their “lifeworlds”. The effects on people´s “lifeworlds” are, 
in principle, relevant when a control system is fully assessed.  
Time is a main aspect. It is vital to capture how control problems are handled in the 
immediate perspective, but so are the contexts over time to which these problems belong. 
The resource issues of an organisation involve a dynamic problem: so is their underlying 
character even if it appears in the form of financial crises on certain occasions. The 
prerequisites for activities are changing all the time. From a rationalistic point of view, the 
question is how an organisation and its members can and should consider this factor in each 
urgent situation.  
An empirical basis is important, as well as attention to phenomena that are difficult to 
observe. The possibility to conceive and describe is one further aspect that is important for 







My general approach can be described in simple terms as follows. There are global value 
chains, from resources to output that are in use. These chains change with time. Uncertainty 
and unpredictability prevail for the present state and for possible changes; to some extent it 
is possible to estimate risks of the future. At any moment, each organisation has taken some 
limited position on a chain. Each organisation has a hierarchy which lies above operations. 
Over time, chains, organisations, hierarchies, output and personal functions vary. According 
to my approach, insights into control problems for every organisation and system can be 
gained by analysing relationships between global value chains and a hierarchy of one or 
several organisations. Time is crucial.    
Described in more elaborate terms, this theory consists of a description of an extensive 
course of states and events where no time-limits are imposed. At each point in time, many 
types of relationships exist with at least some connection to the organisation. What the 
description of all these relationships covers is the latitudinal dimension. In principle, there 
are no spatial limits to my description but I concentrate on the situation in a Western country 
like Sweden. There is also a longitudinal dimension – this description involves the passage 
of time.
11 In principle, there is no obvious beginning but for practical purposes I have used 
 
                                                            
10 The concept of Instrumentality is widely discussed by sociologists and philosophers. Jürgen Habermas uses 
the concept and also the concept of “lifeworld”. Technical, economical and political systems are governed by 
instrumental reasoning and represent something different than “lifeworld” of individuals. However, what 
happens in these systems strongly affects the “lifeworld” that basically has another rationality (for example, 
Habermas, 1987, chapter. VIII). Within auditing and accounting, Michael Power talks about “colonization”, 
when economic perspectives and rituals for verification take over.  
11 Krugman, in The Self-Organizing Economy, also has a longitudinal and a latitudinal perspective. He talks 
about self-organisation both in space and time.  
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the second Industrial Revolution as a starting point. With my references to Swedish 
experiences that means the last few decades of the 19
th century.
12  
Four latitudinal areas are defined. They partly overlap, but they represent strikingly 
different points of view. The first concerns the functions for human beings of what is 
accomplished through organisations, their activities and output – functions of a personal, 
family and collective character are satisfied, including very vague and/or very individual 
functions. The second area concerns the structure of organisations and activities and of 
transactions and relations that various parties have with each other. Structural forces operate 
in and around an organisation tacitly or obviously, slowly or rapidly. Much of this can be 
identified only by considering the structure thoroughly. The third area covers the control 
systems in the sense of recurring procedures and methods that are used to relate present and 
future functions to resources, externally and internally. These financial control tools are 
important from an individual organisation´s point of view but also for larger economic 
systems. A good many recurring procedures and methods can rather easily be perceived on a 
current occasion and also be described afterwards. A theory of financial control for 
organisations places a natural emphasis on them, and they should be viewed in the context of 
the three other latitudinal areas. A fourth area depicts the specific processes of individual 
organisations for a certain issue. Often, such processes are extremely intensive while they are 
going on but difficult to remember and describe in detail afterwards, and not least difficult to 
provide with an unambiguous context.  
Each latitudinal area has its course and its own relationships with time. Time patterns 
differ between areas. Courses of different latitudinal areas may be sequential, occur 
simultaneously or be interdependent. Structure and the financial control system work 
together. A basic back-coupling is a profound element in a long-range perspective. Structure 
and financial control system at a certain point of time is a basis for every specific process in 
an organisation. What comes out of such a process affects functions for individuals and 
groups of individuals. In principle also, the structure of the entire economy and the control 
systems are marginally affected when individual processes in and around organisations take 
place.   
Courses of each latitudinal area comprise relationships within global value chains, 
hierarchy processes and interactions between the two. I call value chain processes horizontal 
processes. Many chains shape a total structure of connected organisations and activities – 
with local, national and global components. Each organisation covers some part of a chain 
through its input, activities and output. Normally, its activity flow can be seen as rather 
stable series of events running through the organisation. Ultimately, what is accomplished in 
these chains provides functions for individuals or groups of individuals in various respects. 
For each organisation, with its part of the total horizontal chains, there is a hierarchy and a 
structure above operative units. Bodies of the formally highest order and all other of these 
units are linked together by a process, including certain procedures for decisions about the 
organisation and its parts. I call this a vertical process.     
The pattern of transactions and relations between parties is in itself an important 
component of the total control system. Beyond this, particular control systems are explicitly 
introduced, for instance, systems of financial accounting and management control. These 
systems are developed in response to an existing structure, but often they will also reinforce 
                                                            
12I have explored an idea in Hayman, How to read a play. He writes, page 50: “In a novel or a play we have to 
start at the beginning and work our way to the end, which means there are two basic kinds of relationships. The 
latitudinal relationships are those that exist simultaneously at any one moment of action, while the relationships 
involving the passage of time are longitudinal.”  
6 
 
the properties and tendencies of this structure. Prevailing structures and control systems 
constitute a decisive basis on the occasions when an organisation goes through specific 





Financial control systems are defined as mechanisms that relate visions and functions to 
resources and where money is involved directly or indirectly. Ultimately, they are based on 
money, that is to say, widely transferable rights and obligations that presume trust in 
transferability and, as media of exchange, make almost all sorts of transactions possible. 
Control systems, with money as the fundamental element, have a broad and varied character. 
My descriptions of such systems cover some different and interrelated primary aspects. 
How are rules related to each other? Applied rules – about decision-making, 
measurement, financial sources, payments, construction of financial instruments, procedures 
and communication – can either be legal in their nature or simply be exercised practically. 
The issue of how rules are related to each other is important not least in the fields of 
accounting measurement and financial reporting. Consistency is decisive for what the 
meaning of comparisons will be.  
What is represented and how is this done? The contents of financial control systems can 
be regarded in relation to individual events that will take place or have taken place. Numbers 
and text are common tools of expression but not the only ones; for instance, visual means 
have become more and more important, even if it is difficult to show an administrative 
process visually. Measures may more or less represent what has actually happened or will 
happen in individual cases. An important long-range trend during the last century was that 
financial control systems represent identifiable individual circumstances to a lesser degree. 
Who are the intended or actual users of a system, in what context do they use it and how 
do they use it? A users´ perspective can be applied to a financial control system. At least 
since the mid-20
th century, usefulness has been a keyword in academic texts about financial 
accounting as well as management control. When particular systems are designed, 
developers normally think of a target group and representation is varied with regard to 
usefulness and the behaviour of this group. Designers have acquired some picture of this 
behaviour in the specific case – they accept and adapt to it or they want actively to change it 
(which is common for internal systems). The evolution of systems in a broader sense may 
have its starting point in the procedures for how and why a customer buys a product – 
organisations build systems to capture and affect these procedures. There is an interaction 
between those system components that are partially outside the organisation and the totally 
internal systems.  
 
 
A  PERSPECTIVE  ON  ECONOMY  AND  ORGANISATIONS  FROM 
THE POINT OF VIEW OF INDIVIDUALS 
 
After industrial evolution and constitutional reforms in the mid-19
th century, financial and 
political systems began to develop.  Gradually, new prerequisites for economic activities led 
to material progress for many people and also modified functions generally. Output from 
organisations made it possible to improve material functions: goods and services with 
specific properties could be utilized as means for personal functions in a direct and general  
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way, irrespective of differences in social and personal context. Not least primary needs could 
be satisfied. Beyond material functions, there were also experiential functions of output that 
were closely related to social and personal contexts. Dependencies within a family 
diminished and were replaced by other dependencies. An adequate financial function was 
needed to afford improvements of material and experiential functions:  the capacity to 
provide financial resources and ways of handling such resources.
13 
Within rather short periods in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, many industrial 
organisations were established or restructured, providing products and work.  Financial 
institutions developed too, basically to handle money and risks: individuals could turn to 
banks and insurance companies that had often specialised in satisfying a limited function or a 
geographical area. Stock market trading acquired more systematic forms. A personal 
financial function was needed by every household as a decisive prerequisite. States and other 
public bodies developed. According to parliamentary democracy, each adult citizen had the 
vote, nationally and locally. States created systems for certain material functions and the 
transmittance of money. Different sides of economic activities, such as work, consumption 
and saving, were no longer so firmly interconnected within a family or even for an 
individual.
14 Each employed individual had a working relation with one organisation and 
each family used output from many.  
Work was the important financial source and it also meant experiential functions and 
dysfunctions for employed individuals. Within many families, women were financially 
dependent on income-generating husbands and restricted to experiential functions of family 
work. No longer was a family entirely dependent on uncertainties close to them. In several 
ways, uncertainty was shared with others. For those who could afford it, savings and 
financial deposits were a possible answer to future needs. Early and weak support from State 
allocation systems appeared. Thus, the conditions for time and uncertainties had changed. 
Economic activities were spatially spread and time horizons could be changed. Progress in 
material functions was made and experiential functions were basically modified. 
Uncertainties that originated from inadequate financial functions of organisations could 
cause wide disturbances. Distribution among citizens was still uneven.   
During the decades of the mid-20
th century, work, industry and trade became less local. 
Financial organisations merged but they still concentrated on special parts of financial 
functions and special customer groups. Commercial banks, saving banks and insurance 
companies operated on similar segmented markets as before – borrowing for house and 
home was important. In a country like Sweden, financial markets were regulated by the State 
and state authorities.  Essentially, frameworks were national. Savings were entrusted to 
banks and insurance companies. States and other public bodies developed systems for further 
material and experiential functions, the transmittance of money and improved social security 
for individuals.  This was a period of general growth. Families changed and professional 
occupations developed. More women had employed work and so tended to be less dependent 
financially on income-generating husbands. Functions within the public administration 
sphere expanded and extended, especially during the decades after the Second World War. 
Directly or indirectly, many citizens became dependent on public cash flows and functions, 
                                                            
13  Two sources have given me impulses for the following description. The first is Gunderson, Lance H, & 
Holling C.S., Panarchy. Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. The other is 
Ferguson, Niall, The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. I am grateful to Albert Danielsson 
who drew my attention to a review of this book. 
14 This development can be described in terms of Tönnies´s concepts Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. These are 
concepts from the 19
th century that have been described more recently by Asplund.   
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and not as much as before on a financial function that was based on their own income 
generation. Compared with the pre-industrial era, premises for control had now changed. 
Most people had a more remote and marginal influence on economic processes that meant a 
considerably higher material standard of living and widened experiences of output. Larger, 
more complicated structures were still rather manageable. 
Work, industry and trade became more and more international. Material and experiential 
functions changed, improving in many respects. For financial systems, turning points were 
reached during the 1970s and 80s. A general increase in wealth during the century led to 
increased savings volumes on individual and collective bases. These savings were entrusted 
to specialists in saving funds, banks and insurance companies. For her/his financial function, 
each individual had a relation to financial organisations either as one separate customer or 
one ultimate formal principal among many in a collective. After decades of growth, many 
national states had emerging disturbances in their financial functions. Formal control existed 
for individuals both in the public and in the private sector, but forms were very remote.  
For personal financial functions, the development of de-regulated and internationalized 
financial markets was important in the short and long term. For their own financial, material 
and experiential functions, individuals were dependent on the income they generated through 
their own work but also to a large extent on the development of asset markets for securities. 
Dwellings and real estate had double functions: as a home but also as an investment. 
Normally, this required long-term loans. Gradually, the interest costs of dwellings and real 
estate became increasingly important for many households, and national monetary policy 
also became increasingly important for them from this point of view. Double professional 
careers within families were more common, and the relative number of financially 
independent women increased, within or outside traditional nuclear families. 
Towards the end of the 20th century, the transformation of economic activities had 
developed a rather global nature. In a way, this could be seen as one further step in a process 
that had already started with national transformation before or at the beginning of the 
century. Organisations extended their activities, especially across national borders, and 
sometimes they grew very big. Certain functional areas, such as the financial field and the 
communication field, expanded considerably. Now, large financial organisations included 
most products without borderlines between banks and insurance. Many new niche 
organisations were specialists in various subfields of finance and related areas. Different 
sides of economic activities, such as work, consumption and saving, were less firmly 
interconnected within a national frame. Patterns of influence gradually changed; often, 
spatial and mental distance increased from single individuals to ultimate decision bodies, 
both in the private sector and in the public sphere. To a greater extent, what had been 
produced in one country was used in another and therefore needed to be financed at a 
national level by other sources of income. In a more direct sense than before, the outcome of 
savings in one country was dependent on the economic development of companies in other 
countries. Larger, more complicated structures had gradually evolved, and economic 
processes in these structures were less manageable than previously.   
The material, experiential and financial functions of human beings concern consumption 
in all stages of life, the need to maintain a continuous livelihood during a long period, 
professional achievement and participation in saving. The premises of these functions are 
modified through life, and even to some extent basically changed. During the professionally 
active years, time is scarce for many people in the immediate perspective – a great many 
things should be done and income can in part be affected. An attitude to the present and the 
future is required. After the professional years, time constraints in the immediate perspective  
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are not as strong or at least are different. The possibilities to affect income from work are 
minor.  
For some material functions, output is used rather frequently and easily without contacts 
at moments of use between a user and the supplying organisation. In other cases, moments of 
use are highly infrequent and they take place without contact but perhaps not quite so easily. 
For certain material functions, use contacts between users and representatives of supplying 
organisations are pivotal. For experiential functions, context is, by definition, important. 
Individual and social conditions may be decisive for use value. The relative importance of 
functions changes during life, and it varies between individuals, cultures and epochs.   
Around the year 2000, family patterns and economic functions were very heterogeneous, 
including financial dependency structures. Trends towards professional careers and financial 
independence for women had continued. Generally, long-term ties between individuals and 
organisations had weakened in most respects. Social experiences of economic activities for 
each individual were tied to each aspect and relation rather than to a coherent and long-term 
entirety. In addition, pre-use contacts and use contacts between users and supplying 
organisations in many cases had been de-personalised and made more remote through 
comprehensive and standardised electronic systems; in other respects, communication and 
action had been facilitated.  
Far-reaching global structures for financial and non-financial organisations had evolved to 
handle the various sides of economic and financial activities. Immediate material functions 
had been improving in many parts of the world but primary functions were quite 
unsatisfactory in other parts. Improvements and uncertainties had a global context; they were 
both shared within larger systems than before. Interconnections mean that benefits and the 
burdens of uncertainties are shared by many people and units but they also mean mutual and 
common dependency. Larger, complicated structures decrease adaptive capability. In a 
country like Sweden, there were improvements and flexibility for many people but also 
personal vulnerability with regard to financial functions. Public administration within 
national boundaries had its own structurally growing problems. Uncertainties made the long-
term sustainability of environmental functions genuinely unpredictable.  
 
 





My definition of “organisation” concerns entities that are working continuously, not 
temporarily – this does not necessarily mean that they tend to be eternal. Each organisation 
consists of units that together have two types of tasks: handling operations directly or 
indirectly and handling financial issues, both on a continuous basis for this particular entity. 
The boundaries of an “organisation” are not self-evident. My concept is also influenced by 
my analytical starting points: dependencies and independencies between economic activities 
and between human beings. Fundamentally, an organisational entity can hardly function in 
isolation, standing totally by itself and disregarding its surroundings. On the contrary, there 
are always reciprocal relationships between an organisation and its environment, close and 
remote, short-term and long-term. But this is a question of degrees. Some activities have 
strong mutual relationships and are at the same time relatively independent of other ones,  
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operationally and/or financially. This is my main basis for defining the limits of an 
“organisation” from a financial point of view. Some degree of autonomy is required. 
A horizontal series of events always has a financial side for the organisation: the level of 
incoming prices and costs in relation to output and prices, if any. Financial flows are 
attached to different parties and ambiguity is very limited. A flow is referred to each 
organisation, credited and debited. I label some organisations “financial entities”. These are 
rather independent from an activity point of view and/or a financial point of view; financial 
autonomy concerns their position in relation to financial sources. Some are not included in a 
resource allocation system of any superior principal and are autonomous in this sense. Others 
are somewhat autonomous, even if they receive their money from a superior principal. They 
have to bear the consequences of how volumes and prices develop without (full) 
compensation through allotment from other parties. Categorization, especially in the second 





At one end of the activity flow of an organisation there are resource providers and at the 
other end there are users of output.  
Resource providers  are individuals or other organisations. Not  least those who are 
involved personally in the organisation, workers, constitute a key group. They have reasons 
for holding two parallel perspectives, one as a participant among others in organisational 
processes and the other as an external provider who has his/her own context: what does this 
give me? They need a livelihood and meaning in their professional lives. Suppliers may 
develop long-term relations to an organisation, beyond conventional competition in a 
market. Lenders have, in principle, a contractual right to compensation, not a residual right. 
On critical occasions, their influence on an organisation may be more decisive than even that 
of the largest owners. 
Users are other organisations or individuals, end users. Users and buyers are not 
necessarily identical. Thus, an organisation meets either professional buyers and users or 
individual human beings who are trying to satisfy material and/or experiential functions. An 
acceptable price – an exchange value – is potentially important for buyers and mostly also 
for users. Use can be long-range or temporary, urgent or dispensable. Pre-use contacts 
between a user and supplying organisation can be extensive or not. At moments of use, there 
may be no contacts or such contact is the very core of the user function. Output may be 
standardised or customized to suit individual users.    
Borders to the surroundings of organisations are not sharp. In part, activities, functions 
and dysfunctions in the horizontal line do not recognize any organisational borders, and 
besides, they may change gradually. An end user may have a very distinct interface with a 
selling organisation, as is the case when s/he uses a physical product on her/his own. Or the 
interface is more diffuse; people of the providing organisation interact with the beneficiary. 
Each party has its own position against an organisation as such, including those who work 
there. 
Despite a lack of absolute horizontal borders, most organisations, to some extent, tend to 
live in separate worlds. They focus on their own activities, interpreted and represented at 
each point of time by an inner circle or a leader.  Operations are developed according to 
external impulses, internal mechanisms, previous experiences and views about the future. 
Organisations stand for continuity. They embody knowledge and identity, and they may 
function as centers of experience and attention. In those cases, established values will have a  
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self-evident weight and will affect what is being done. Sometimes, individual affiliation may 






Besides resource providers and users of output, there are a number of other interested parties 
in and around an organisation. Western economies that developed during the 19
th and 20
th 
centuries required an infrastructure of functions and organisations, not least civil laws about 
ownership.  General rule-makers  are public or private organisations that institute laws, 
prescribe standards or publish recommendations for society, including activities run by 
organisations and capital issues. Organised examiners, for example auditors, conduct regular 
reviews in individual organisations mainly on behalf of principals in the vertical line. 
Supervisory boards are public or private organisations that are in charge of general 
supervision. They have the option of taking measures when some organisation does not 
comply with general rules. Operative authorities deal with law issues of another type than 
general supervision, for example taxation or permissions for mergers and acquisitions. 
Representatives act on behalf of somebody who is directly affected by activities in an 
organisation. 
Within an organisation, there are operative units and a hierarchy above them. Central 
executives cover the entire organisation. Activities directly under central executives are 
divided according to one main criterion, or a combination of several. In turn, each subunit is 
divided into smaller subunits on several levels. Total activities may contain a great number 
of dimensions that may be reflected in organisational patterns and procedures; in large 
organisations, complexity is unavoidable. Often, there is a board above central executives. 
Accumulated capital is available in the vertical line. Financial principals are at the top of the 
hierarchy; sometimes they appear step by step.  
Some actors are important in diagonal processes, that is, they do not have their own 
horizontal or vertical identity but they can share perspectives in their way of handling 
matters. Professional observers view an organisation at a distance. They have roles defined 
by parties that are total outsiders in relation to the organisation, general rule-makers and 
supervisors. Here, I am thinking of analysts, journalists and academics who teach and write, 
for example.  Benefactors and sponsors contribute money or assistance without getting a 
corresponding value of the organisation’s normal output in return.      
In many respects, interests are common for the various parties around and in an 
organisation. By fulfilling a function for one party, an interest for another party is also 
satisfied. Even a feeling of affinity may arise.    In a fundamental sense, though, ambitions 
are often in conflict. Each individual tends to base his/her actions in a certain context on 
his/her own separate interests, or separate interests close to him or her. However, linking 
also takes place from various points of view – people try to connect different perspectives or 
processes. For this and other reasons, activities are structurally interconnected, both in 
latitudinal and longitudinal dimensions, and nowadays also on a global scale. To a high 






For some organisations, there is a basic and direct relationship between the horizontal line 
and the vertical line. Principals of the vertical chain want horizontal activities pursued 
because it is just this kind of activities that satisfies an interest or a need for a special group 
of people or for themselves. Government regards health care, taxation or certain cultural 
events as important, so financial resources are allocated to these fields. Real-estate owners 
want improved protection against fire, so they found a mutual insurance company. Wine 
peasants are associated within a producers´ cooperative. People interested in local ice-
hockey involve themselves in a non-profit-making club. Or they enjoy financial business life 
and want to be a part of it. These are function-driven organisations. For them, there is a 
coupling between the vertical engagement and the horizontal content in the specific case. 
Often, the particular connection between principals and functions means a long-term 
duration of relations between organisation and principals – a principal may not even find a 
substitute in any other organisation. At least, it is not a part of continuous choices issue by 
issue. Organisations of this kind may or may not face competition. Legal forms may vary. 
For other organisations, relationships between the vertical line and the horizontal line are 
different. These are pay-driven organisations. Principals of the vertical chain may satisfy 
their interests through payments from horizontal activities, their ultimate aim is not to satisfy 
a certain function for particular beneficiaries and they are willing to consider various options 
in terms of activities and output. In pure cases, there is no coupling between principals of the 
vertical chain and beneficiaries to utilize the specific horizontal process, beyond the transfer 
of money. This does not mean that material, experiential and operational functions are 
unimportant but specific functions for specific groups are not the ultimate and primary 
concerns of a certain organisation. Often horizontal independence is high. Relations to 
sellers or buyers are not special and do not give any particular advantages or disadvantages 
in operations, nor any special support or binding obstacles. In this sense, these organisations 
are commercial units – transactions are at arm´s length. Thus normally, they meet some 
competition, and often severe competition. 
The output of pay-driven units is expected to be of value to a buyer, who is therefore 
willing to pay. A surplus or a deficit appears, and principals in the vertical line make 
dispositions in accordance with legal rules. Their financial flows and purchasing power arise 
either continuously from current operations or through exchange values for shares and 
organisational parts. They may be financially independent in the sense that they have no 
particular relations to financial sources: these relations are commercial too. Neither 
principals in the vertical line nor buyers of output have any strongly durable commitments. 
Major owners may stay for a long time. Alternatively, owners participate as market actors 
with shares on or outside the stock exchanges. Principals in the vertical line may change. 
The time horizon of an owner position may have any length, even an extremely short one. 
They exercise some influence through their holding. More or less intensely they carry out 
transactions with their shares.  
The distinction between function-driven and pay-driven organisations is helpful, not least 
for complicated patterns, even if particular organisations sometimes may be difficult to 








For function-driven organisations, financial flows must basically be regarded in relation to 
certain aspects of the horizontal process. For pay-driven organisations, on the other hand, 
financial flows are a primary variable in their own right – in principle, surpluses or deficits 
can be regarded as something separate, no matter what is provided in other respects. Activity 
flow and the outcome of the horizontal process can be treated simply as a means to create 
surpluses. Needless to say, this is not necessarily the case. Many principals in the vertical 
process place an emphasis on horizontal events and make a trade-off between different 
interests. 
Every organisation needs a financial function:  the capacity to provide activities with 
financial resources and ways of managing such resources. Relationships between horizontal 
events and financial functions are interdependent. Resources are needed for horizontal 
activities. On the other hand, operations influence inflows, directly or indirectly. A 
decreasing allocation of resources to operations may mean that present or future operations 
deteriorate or become more efficient, which in turn will affect future inflows and outflows, 
negatively or positively from an organisation´s point of view.  
Various forms of uncertainties and risks are involved. Firstly, operational uncertainties 
are important. Variations in horizontal events are possible, including variations in cash in- 
and outflows, the most obvious example being shifts of ordinary commercial income-
generating activities. Secondly, financial uncertainties originate from the financial position 
of the organisation. Possible variations in cash in- and outflows are related to the impact of 
the financial function and to the way in which this function works. To varying degrees, 
organisations are sensitive to possible horizontal variations and events and to possible 
measures taken in the outside financial markets and allocation systems. An organisation may 
have a capacity of its own to take care of financial effects of variations in both these 
respects. Or quite the reverse, their dependence on external markets and allocating systems 
may make them very sensitive to states and changes in these external systems. Thirdly, 
operational and financial uncertainties together are premises of horizontal actions at present 
and for the future.  
Access to financial resources is a necessity for organisations. Conditions for their 
financial functions vary. Many pay-driven organisations may be financially rather 
independent, in the sense that their accumulated financial position is no obstacle to operative 
mobility. In this case, they have a relatively autonomous standing. Other pay-driven 
organisations still have accumulated funds as the basis of their development, but they are 
financially weaker and more vulnerable to variations in financial and allocating systems. For 
a self-sustained organisation, the financial function often means a trade-off between the need 
of organisational development and the financial uncertainties that are inherent in an 
expansive strategy. Function-driven organisations normally have financial dependence in the 
sense that funds are periodically and regularly transmitted from allocating units. Sometimes, 
they are given an essential degree of financial independence. They are, partly or entirely, 






In continuous activities, there may be either a use-perspective on resources or an exchange-
perspective. Some organisations, function-driven or pay-driven, have relatively limited  
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possibilities to adapt to the development of incoming prices. Their own inflows, whether 
operating revenues or allotted means, are not adjusted. Therefore, changing conditions make 
it necessary to re-consider the significance of existing activity flows. Function-driven 
organisations may in reality have to continue their activities within new financial limits. For 
pay-driven organisations there are several alternatives: to expand, to wind up or to 
restructure.  
Pay-driven organisations need a strategic attitude to price movements in their resource 
markets and product markets. For some organisations, trading is not a core activity, but 
price-conditioned cost changes are important for how main operations are carried out and for 
compensatory actions. Thus, there is often an element of trading even in these cases. 
Possible shifts of incoming prices constitute the basis for purchasing and selling strategies. 
For other pay-driven organisations, pure trading of goods and services is the nature of 
activity flows.  Values-in-exchange are in natural focus.      
Within financial business areas, prices of securities and savings instruments are key 
variables, and so are therefore expectations about prices. Expectations, in turn, can aim at 
fundamentals behind the values or possible exchange values as such, whatever the reasons. 
The more the financial markets have developed, the more pure trading elements have 
appeared, that is, deals that are based on predictions and re-predictions of future values-in-
exchange with various time perspectives, including very short horizons. I refer to some 
organisations as transfer-driven. Their activity is, directly or indirectly, based on transactions 





Value chains change over time, as do hierarchies above horizontal flows, diagonal forces and 
the role and functioning of particular organisations and sub-units: how dependencies and 
independencies are constructed, operationally and financially, and what conditions there are 
for the financial function of organisations. In this course of events, structure influences 
financial control systems, which in turn are important for how structure can be designed and 
work. Analytically, structure and financial control systems can be separated, but they are two 
interwoven elements of financial control. Structure and financial control systems vary 
between countries and over time, even though similar long-range phenomena sooner or later 
appear in different countries. The description below primarily captures developments in 
Sweden. Indications of time are approximate – I have tried to show the main features of 





At an early stage, pay-driven companies were managed by circles close to an owner and a 
family, on their conditions. People in the neighbourhood were dependent on their attitudes 
and financial capacity. Most sub-units within the pay-driven organisations concerned 
functions. Function-driven organisations were not so numerous and so large. This was also 
the case within the State and municipalities. They were evaluated and financed by 
representatives as principals. 
During the 20
th century, vertical structures and processes developed fundamentally. They 
were strengthened, both outside and within organisations. Power distribution along the 
vertical line varied, but generally there was a clear trend towards conditioned  
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decentralisation. Shorter time periods were followed up more frequently. Not only wealthy 
individuals but also people in general became dependent on rates of return on stock markets 
as a financial source. This change, implemented through institutional ownership, affected 
how the economy worked. Also, the vertical structure became more and more multinational 
for private organisations. In certain cases, owners came from various countries, group 
management and headquarter from another country than most of the owners, subsidiaries 
were located in a third and operating units in a fourth country, which might be the same as 
for some of the higher levels. For nations, not least in Europe, super-national levels 
developed in critical respects.   
Structures and control systems were more and more oriented towards relating costs in one 
step of the horizontal flow with immediate and tangible functions in the next step. Pay-
driven organisations were established wherever possible. Function-driven organisations 
often developed a pseudo-commercial nature. Some of them were given financial 
independence in the sense that their income-generating capability was decisive for activity 
volume. There was a general move away from function-driven units that were managed in 
traditional cost-based forms. Strictly identifying output, and assigning prices, rather than 
emphasizing common and less distinct functions, was one of the most noticeable ideas in 
financial control during the latter part of the 20
th century. A tendency towards 
“commodification” evolved. For function-driven organisations too, some kind of “product” 
is delivered from producers to users, who are human beings or organisations and who may 
have a real option or not.  
In the horizontal line, thus, structures and financial control systems were more and more 
oriented towards specific use, immediate use, target groups or at least pronounced views of 
target groups. The period in and around the 1970s was an exception to this development, 
with a heavy emphasis on union and employee perspectives. At the same time as the focus 
on tangible use gradually increased, the activities of many units had more distant 
connections to end use. To an increasing extent, horizontal flows were extended across 
national borders. Thus, interdependences were more complex, including being more 
comprehensive spatially. Technology and the internet changed patterns and distances 
between organisations and users. Efficient relations with an output user from an 
organisation´s point of view did not necessarily mean routines that favoured pre-use 
contacts, accessibility and contacts at the moments of use from the users´ point of view. 
Often, experiential functions of output required flexible human use contacts rather than the 





At an early stage within the private sphere, ownership and executive position were formally 
separated. Stock markets were established. Auditing was introduced. During the first decades 
of the 20
th century, centralistic hierarchies with functional responsibilities were dominant in 
companies, which were rather small and manageable. Activities within the public sphere 
were not large. They were carried out in traditional function-driven form, with the emphasis 
on a vertical process.  
Many functions ran parallel in rather limited organisations and needed to be coordinated 
towards an output – either as products to be sold in pay-driven organisations or to fulfil the 
aims of function-driven organisations. Certain large, private organisations operated a 
multinational activity; the spatial dimension with each country was then important for the 
structure of the organisation.   
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For the private sector, generally, freedom of trade was the leading idea in most respects. 
The bank and insurance sectors, however, were monitored by surveying authorities.  State 
monopolies already existed or were established in certain fields, such as mail services and 
telecommunication, and another kind of monopoly was created for radio broadcasting.    
Unions for workers in private companies and federations and a confederation of trade 
unions had existed since the late 19
th century as a consequence of the transformation from an 
agricultural to an industrial society. In the beginning, they were organised with occupations 
as the basis.  Relations with employers and their federation were hostile. After a few 
decades, industrial unions and federations were created; all workers at the same work place 
should belong to a certain union, irrespective of their occupation. In addition, some labour 





Companies had grown and continued to grow, and more or less clear combinations grew up; 
some companies owned shares in other companies. In the Swedish case, some of these 
companies and combinations had an international profile. The basic structure of 
organisations was mainly the same as before; centralistic hierarchies with functional 
responsibilities were predominant. However, even though the stock market was not 
influential on company activities, greater attention than before was attached to external 
financial reporting, at least in the accounting profession. The mass media – many 
newspapers and radio broadcasting – devoted little interest to business and organisational 
life. 
Despite violent controversies, relations between trade unions and employers´ associations 
developed in a co-operative direction. In a spirit of mutual understanding and as an 
expression of common interests, basic agreements were reached in the 1930s. Later on, 
federations of unions and employers agreed on employee influence and information. The 
main procedures in organisations were affected only marginally by this development.  
Activities within the public sphere expanded, especially during the post-war years, but not 
very rapidly. Function-driven units were controlled in traditional forms with an emphasis on 
vertical budget processes that started long before the period in question. In the post-war 
years, national regulation of horizontal flows in the private sector increased and State 
authorities were introduced to survey prices, competition and consumer rights. Markets for 
foreign exchange dealings and banks were regulated and controlled at the national level. 
Banks were obliged to invest an essential part of their capacity in government and housing 
bonds. A social insurance system was decided in the late 1950s with charges based on 
wages. For the most part, pension funds that were founded with these charges as inflow were 





Companies and combinations of companies continued to grow. They established or acquired 
subsidiaries abroad. Structures and financial control systems shaped the nature of groups as 
an organisational concept within the private sphere. Group executives and group 
management became the important actors. Stock market influence on organisational matters 
was still weak, while internal structures changed profoundly. Centralistic hierarchies with 
functional responsibilities were replaced by decentralisation through divisions and profit  
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centres, in Europe from the 1960’s onwards. Thus, a financial entity often consisted of 
several smaller financial entities – labelled business units – which in turn contained sub-
units. Vertical control and a periodical continuous pressure became the main tools at top 
executive levels and gradually throughout organisations.     
Thus, several business units were running parallel within growing groups.  Basically, they 
were rather independent of each other from an operational point of view, but they were 
dependent on the group financially. Business units could be arranged with regard to user 
categories, the nature of the output, geographical areas or some other important dimension. 
There could be some conflict between these dimensions. From an operational point of view, 
dependence could be difficult to avoid. This was not necessarily the intention, because 
strategic synergies between different business units could possibly give strength. In these 
cases, price mechanisms of ordinary markets served as a model for the transfer pricing of 
pseudo-commercial units. The need to integrate parallel functions was mainly constrained to 
lower levels, where operational dependence was still strong. The number and size of 
function-driven units began to decrease. Besides, many such units needed explicit internal 
customers. There was an increase in the global dimension of business both for sourcing and 
for marketing; production was off-shored to low-cost countries. Nevertheless, business life 
still had mainly a national character. 
The public sector was purely national and was growing too, but no longer slowly. More 
and bigger function-driven organisations basically aimed at some purpose defined within 
organisations and by vertical principals. The increase was in many respects considerable. 
Various budgetary techniques were tried out without really leading to decisive long-term 
improvements in procedures. Normally, tax-financed units do not have the same 
opportunities as pay-driven units to select and to improve productivity in some real sense. 
For this reason alone, costs of output tended to increase continuously. For a long time, this 
was no decisive constraint, because organisations were in the main compensated for price 
changes.  
Unions, federations and confederations also grew in size and importance at both national 
and organisational levels. This was certainly the case in the private sector, but differences 
over time were even more remarkable in the public sphere. Until the 1960s, instruments of 
union influence on organisations within the public sector were few and weak, but this 
situation changed step by step. Private and public sector organisations became similar in this 
respect. Generally speaking, laws were passed in several fields that had previously been 
governed by agreements between the labour market parties. One such law concerned 
employee influence in particular organisations and comprised rules that were more far-
reaching than in the voluntary system it replaced. Employment security was the aim of 
another law with its origin in this period. Dismissals should be preceded by a process carried 
out with unions; they should occur only for certain reasons and employees should be 
dismissed in a certain order. Ownership in companies was debated and investigated. Should 
unions be owners? 
Since the late 1950s, television was a spectacular instrument for information and 
entertainment. The number of newspapers had decreased. Business and organisational life 





At the end of the century, some State regulations and monopolies were abolished. Re-
regulations and new authorities were introduced. Capital and stock markets were de- and re- 
18 
 
regulated. The banks´ obligations to invest in government and housing bonds came to an 
end. Foreign exchange rules became much more liberal.  The tax system was changed. 
Financial markets took on a more international character, due to changed rules and changed 
information technology. In fact, the entire financial sector got new working conditions and 
expanded. In many cases, dual relations were replaced by more developed markets for 
securities. In part, securitization replaced previous forms of loan arrangements between two 
parties.  New financial organisations were founded, even though much of the previous 
structure of institutions initially was retained. In certain industries, State-owned monopolistic 
organisations were replaced by new regulations, new authorities and a number of companies 
that ran businesses within each field: television, radio broadcasting, telecommunication, mail 
services, railway traffic and the like. 
The 1980s represented clearly a shift in ownership and the stock markets. Financial 
institutions grew in size and number, and the financial sector in a broad sense became a main 
instrument for resource allocation and monitoring in society. Ownership through institutions 
increased considerably. The vertical control line was strengthened and pressure downwards 
on the levels of board and group management increased. Influence from employee 
organisations weakened. The ambitions of employers´ associations to make negotiations 
more decentralised and local were successful. In the end, central levels and confederations 
had less importance.  
Internally in large, private organisations, pseudo-commercial units grew in number. Many 
units that were clearly interdependent operationally were regarded as profit centres. 
Financial mechanisms for independent companies served as a model for control systems for 
financially dependent business units. Later on, tendencies to increased pressure on group 
management coincided with an internal focus on horizontal processes. However, this was 
only temporary. After a time, the internal vertical dimension grew in importance again. 
Diversified groups with several parallel business units became less dominant. With time, 
many groups concentrated on a more limited part of the value chain for each business area. 
In addition, many had ambitions to reach end consumers, and to do so in many countries. 
Customizing and low-budget standardised production were two approaches. Off-shoring for 
production moved on to new countries.  A much larger share of functions for such 
organisations than before was provided by other organisations that were further away from 
end consumption in space, activity and time, and in many cases they were also further away 
from production that was connected to this consumption.  
After post-war expansion, tensions between volume and financial resources within the 
public sphere became more visible. Scarcity of funds in relation to explicit ambitions became 
more and more noticeable. In Sweden, the government tried various new approaches to the 
allocation and control of resources. New structures and control systems were introduced with 
many elements similar to those within the private sector, such as commodification and 
pseudo-commercial techniques. Limitations of the funds that were allotted periodically 
constituted major disturbances and encouraged organisations to adopt activities beyond 
rationalizations.  To a greater extent, function-driven units within the public sphere became 
dependent on funds they were able to generate in operations. In addition, some organisations 
started pay-driven sub-units parallel to the original function-driven activity. Certain 
functions in the public sphere were provided through a structure of organisations, one of 
which was function-driven and others private and pay-driven.  
Re-regulation of the financial and communicative fields was a prime mover behind the 
courses of event during the late 20
th century. In general, surveillance has expanded greatly. 
Many more people and bodies devote themselves to resource allocation and efficiency 
assessments of how other people accomplish their tasks. Many more structures have been  
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erected with the aim of making activities more efficient and of improving the way in which 
certain human needs are satisfied. Thus, handling scarcity also requires resources. To an 
essential extent, these activities exist because social and economic development during the 
20
th century meant increased wealth for large groups of people, including citizens of nations 
and saving collectives. The need for professional bodies to take care of their interests has 
increased.  
Much more external attention has been attached to business and organisational life. 
Journalists and analysts, as almost everybody else, work within boundaries of organisations. 
Each presentation of a story is made to fill a function within its own specific context and is 
driven by story-teller forces in this particular process. Most professions have perceptions of 
target groups and how to satisfy them within constraints of time and costs. Descriptions by 
the mass media and analysts add to vertical control. They express views of particular 
relevance to those who are top principals of organisations formally but at a very remote 
distance. The mass media also have a similar role in relation to numerous end users. Many 
recipients within organisations are involved too. Internally, public reports could be a tool for 





Previous trends involving separation, concentration, networking and cooperation with minor 
and major surrounding parties had shaped conditions for the beginning of the 21
st century. 
Complex constellations were rather common. In horizontal processes, many parties were 
involved and they had, to some extent, a common interest in making an entire chain work. 
On the other hand, each party had its own separate benefits and uncertainties, short-term and 
long-term, financially and in operational terms. Within the public sector, for the most part, 
strict accountability in budgetary terms reinforced this structural behaviour. Pricing made it 
even more striking in business life. Previously, a use perspective for a long horizontal chain 
had been sufficient within the frames of an extensive financial unit. With the new structure, 
exchange values were necessary in several steps and strategic considerations within every 
such step.  
The interplay between super-national bodies, nations and multinational organisations had 
developed a new pattern. International mergers and acquisitions had tended to create groups 
with Swedish entities as subsidiaries and a group headquarter somewhere else. The public 
sphere had a national context. The national state was not an ultimate control subject to the 
same unconditional extent as before. Control and support activities with national aims 
needed to be considered in the multinational context as well. 
Coverage by the mass media and analysts remained intense. However, the internet 
induced two-way communication without gate-keeping but often with powerful post-use 
information routines.  Potentially, all this could have a great effect on vertical and horizontal 





A present structure satisfies present functions for many people and organisations, and there 
are also incentives for fundamental changes that may improve, more or less radically, the 
quality and quantity of functions for the future, and also modify the distribution of wealth. 
While functions are satisfied at present, the economic system is rapidly transforming, both  
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nationally and globally, including structure in vertical and horizontal terms. Organisations 
are exposed to this development, which means opportunities and uncertainties, and often 
genuine uncertainty for the future. How will identified conditions move and what will be the 
result? What impact would different actions have? To what extent is it possible to grasp 
courses of decisive events even with hindsight? Organisations may make changes in their 
structural conditions and their financial control system, and they make certain specific 
decisions, given the structure and control system as they are. 
For an organisation, the financial situation at any given point in time is part of a structural 
course that can be affected only to a limited extent by this entity. For many activities, costs 
rise gradually in relation to output or possible prices. Ongoing steps in the course may be 
conceived and described only partially. This is especially true of a turning point and what is 
later regarded as a temporary rise or fall. However, surpluses or costs often develop 
systematically, due to a number of factors outside the range of specific activities. It is 
common to find long, structural courses of events in which surpluses decrease or costs rise in 
a problematic manner. Such cost processes are important continuous driving forces for 
action, both in business groups that face international competition and in public sector 
organisations.    Of course, radically new products and new technical solutions present the 
hardest prediction problems. Not only are fundamental issues uncertain in themselves. 
Predictions are also required about what other people believe, what they in turn think about 
the beliefs of everybody else and to what extent this will form the basis of their actions.  
Analyses, information and debates about an organisation have two important conditions. 
The first, uncertainty and risk, is shared by everybody, even central executives.
15 Normally, 
uncertainty is greater or at least different for external parties; in that sense there is 
information asymmetry. The second condition is possibilities of observation. What could be 
noticed about the current situation and output, where could it be observed and how could it 
be expressed? Some circumstances are easily captured, some get major exposure and still 
others can be conceived only close-up. Measurability varies. Quality differences, in a non-
subjective form, can be attached only to some output, and in certain respects.  
Scarcity and the availability of alternatives appear for individuals, for organisations, for 
nations, for large collectives that have evolved such as Western countries together or for the 
entire unique and global system, ultimately concerning physical and biological conditions for 
the earth as a settlement. Scarcity of a certain kind can change – decrease or increase: 
innovations can make a profound difference or, instead, resources of limited magnitude are 
disposed of gradually. Alternatives can be easy to find or good substitutes may be lacking. 
Many goal conflicts in such cases concern social relations, so they are a matter of judgement 
about social order and common systems. Sometimes, relations between two parties are 
important for both, which is a prerequisite for real reciprocity. At other times, there is no 
balance. A function is significant for one party, but an individual relation is not decisive for 
the other party. In part, laws are constructed to counteract such imbalances. However, many 
relationships are not basically social. Physical and biological processes go on, irrespective of 
human perceptions and standpoints about any relations. In all courses concerning social or 
natural systems, a great deal is going on without very noticeable signs. Some forces are not 
evident until limits have been reached; before that, they may be given only minor attention.  
                                                            
15 Often distinctions are made between risk, uncertainty and genuine uncertainty. I use the term “uncertainty” as 
a general expression for various kinds of unknown or unpredictable states, irrespective of what type of variable 
is concerned.  When I make a distinction, “risk” refers to a future state where something specific may occur; 
sometimes probabilities are attached or can be attached to this.     
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Each interest is a potential driving force or obstacle for an organisation, of varying power 
and visibility. To an important extent, dependencies and underlying forces can be captured 
by identifying the various sub-processes that may arise around these interests, which are 
partially in conflict with each other, and exploring how such sub-processes are 
interconnected: between principals, board and central executives, the internal vertical 
process, the internal horizontal process, between organisation and workers, between 
organisation and buyers/users. Sooner or later, long-range cost processes tend to cause one 
interest to stand in opposition to another. 
Some of those who control an organisation and its parts have direct contact with activities 
and direct experience of them. However, much influence is exercised at a distance. To some 
extent, this is natural. The role of a board, for example, is mainly to influence, without 
having direct and continuous contact with the activities to be controlled. Board members 
should contribute other perspectives than those given by people in operative units. In 
democracies, ultimate decision-makers – the voters – are at a considerable distance from 





Horizontal processes contain many of the factors that are ultimately significant for 
everybody in his/her unique life as a social being, consumer and worker. Additionally, 
purely financial transactions take place in such processes. Many pivotal horizontal processes 
are in a state of high tensions and vertical processes set conditions. At least latently and in 
the course of time, interests stand in opposition to each other: financiers´ opportunities to use 
resources in alternative ways, room for action for a continuous organisation, the output and 
prices offered to users, and working conditions, including remuneration. Relationships 
between external processes and internal processes are important; variations in direction and 
strength are many. They may vary over time. Shifts in surroundings, without any particular 
immediate connection to an individual organisation, may nevertheless form a crucial 
strategic impulse.  
All horizontal processes have some similarities but each one also has its own profile, 
especially those that essentially intervene in some person´s urgent functions. Organisational 
behaviour is important in this context. In the horizontal line, organisations act forwards and 
backwards. Forwards, they make offers and provide output to users and buyers. Mostly, they 
want output to be appreciated and, especially in the case of pay-driven organisations, to 
appear as competitive, that is, particular and difficult to substitute for a certain group of 
buyers and users. Communicative elements are user-oriented and perhaps personal, at least 
on the surface, while uniformity, standardisation and efficiency are essential for 
accomplished services as well as physical products as such. Backwards, organisations try to 
substitute, that is, look for opportunities to replace one resource with another and to reduce 
input and costs. In the horizontal line, information systems for interaction between 
organisations and external parties, especially customers, have changed radically. Control 
systems gradually develop to capture external events, views and tendencies and to influence 
the surrounding actors. 
At the same time, each individual wants to preserve and improve capabilities from his/her 
point of view and to have liberty of choice. Ambitions and hopes for consumption vary with 
fundamental conditions. Many people have alternatives and can make choices for major and 
minor functions. For a majority of people in Western countries, ambitions extend much 
further than to primary functions. Experiential functions have had more weight in relation to  
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material functions. Buyers with purchasing power can take advantage of offers when new 
products are launched and are, in general, attracted by opportunities to substitute.  For 
various reasons, in some parts of the world and at some stages in life, individual influence on 
most pivotal functions is only marginal. 
As workers, most people are themselves candidates for being removed and perhaps 
substituted. Spatial boundaries tend to widen step by step. Professional practices of 
restructuring have changed accordingly. The fact that human beings are possible substitutes 
from a collective point of view means a decisive dependence on the surrounding entities. 
These circumstances shape conditions for each individual. In principle, the pace of the long- 
and short-term systems movements may be related to possible effects on the unique, finite 
lives of individuals, who have their existential prerequisites and need for mobility and 
influence on their own personal matters.   
Central executives play a key role in vertical control processes, or at least they have a 
possibility to gain this role. Such managers may bridge the gap between the perspectives that 
financial principals represent and activity-oriented perspectives within an organisation. 
Upwards, a manager needs trust from vertical principals to whom the manager has a 
distance. S/he, and accountants, have responsibility for the preparation of reports that 
comply with external standards. Downwards, s/he can arrange a control process on his/her 
conditions. S/he will observe operative activities at a distance that is considerable in large 
organisations. 
Principals at the top, in the private sector as well as in the public sphere, have a special 
mobility because they have alternative uses of money. Financiers are in a position to direct 
requirements placed on the activity, explicitly or implicitly, in combination with financial 
frameworks that are more or less clear. Each activity that needs money from the outside must 
be sufficiently attractive in these respects and for the users of output. Functions and visions 
of an organisation with a continuous activity are confronted with a need for financial 
resources for alternative use. Divergence between the two perspectives is intrinsically 
unavoidable. Decoupling between activities and the financial function can only be temporary 








The whole system of interests, functions and payments which organisations are parts of may 
be viewed as a construction for handling economic scarcity. Financial control systems 
concern the ways in which functions and visions are related to resources within that 
structure. Structure and financial control systems are analytical concepts – no more, no less. 
They should be viewed together when financial control is discussed. They include forms of 
transactions and relations that various parties have with each other. At the society or national 
level, there is hardly any one individual controlling subject that is responsible for structure 
and control system, and this is even more obvious at the global level. To an essential extent, 
self-organisation takes place. At the organisational level, on the other hand, there is a 
controlling subject. However, the interplay between an organisation and its surrounding 
parties is important for internal systems. External impulses and internal control procedures, 
interdependently, shape systems and patterns that are vital for the ways in which functions  
23 
 
and visions are related to resources at the organisational level as well as at higher levels. 
They are instruments for dimensioning, for activity orientation and for efficiency. They 
emerge over time – evolutionarily step by step and through particular systems design 
decisions.  
At early stages during the 19
th century, accounting and costing systems almost only 
covered actual events in specific cases, and very little besides that. Extensive, integrated 
organisations that were financially coherent and basically centralistic were typical of the 
state and ambitions of business life at the beginning of the 20
th century. Only a few fictional 
and future-oriented complements were introduced. Stimulating the survival of existing 
organisations was an important purpose of accounting and costing. Connections between 
organisations and individuals were durable and strong. Risk at company level was the focus 
of systems. Financial power and mobility at this level were major aspects.  
Gradually, intentions shifted towards other perspectives, such as the possibility for 
financial principals to evaluate and government taxation. Thus, similarity and comparability 
became central aspects. Internally, the idea of opportunity costs was also applied to business 
problems but it never became essential for product-costing on a regular basis. In addition, 
discounting techniques for special judgements were introduced.  
Main constructions in the public sector concerned function-driven and tax-financed 
organisations, which by definition were different from private organisations. Nevertheless, 
models and actual design of the early period in both sectors had some basic similarities. 
Organisations in the public sector were centralised and expanding.  Responsibilities were 
structured with regard to functions. The major part of financing was coordinated into one 
principal’s system of prioritisations. Resources were allocated at the discretion of the 
principal. In the course of time, budget processes contained more of a dialogue between 
lower units with their demands and top levels with their requirements. Operations began to 
become integrated, to a certain extent, with the overall activities of the principals. For a long 
time, the principal was financially strong enough to constitute a last resort that was not too 
troubled by its own absolute limitations. 
In the middle of the century, the group concept got a foothold in the private sector, both in 
management control and financial reporting. The idea of governing groups and of reporting 
their income continuously to the public had then been established, not only in the USA. To 
some extent, such permanent organisations became centres of knowledge, experiences and 
identity. The survival of these groups was an important aim, even if owner perspectives were 
strengthened. The risks not to survive, financial power and mobility at group level were main 
considerations.  Views on company financial structures and public financial reporting 
expressed this idea, but gradually, shareholder interests were given more and more weight. 
Still, accounting and costing systems for continuous control emphasized actual events in 
specific cases, but purely economic and future-oriented concepts became a more essential 
ingredient. At the mid-20
th century, circumstantial and ceremonious procedures for long-
range planning and budgeting were introduced. Pseudo-commercial techniques were used for 
operations, but not for financial allocation. Within the public sector, planning and budgeting 
systems were implemented and developed, but the basic view on organisational structure 
was not changed.    
Towards the end of the century, organisational development broke up from these ideas, 
partly as a result of financial realities and considerations. In the private sector, market 
procedures served as a model for pseudo-commercial techniques even for financial 
functions. In the public sector, financial problems were growing and becoming more visible, 
as well as there being increased emphasis on citizens´ opportunities to choose their suppliers 
in certain fields. Many approaches were applied: pseudo-commercial techniques, pure pay- 
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driven organisations as components in value chains and increased income-generation for 
functional units. Financial concerns at upper levels became more urgent. Vertical structures 
had an important shift. Decision power moved one or two steps upwards, away from direct 
representatives of organisations that were close to material functions and experiential 
functions outside the finance field. Time periods that were followed up became shorter and 
regular monitoring became more frequent. 
At this time, planning and budgeting rituals were simplified in many ways. However, this 
did not mean that the ex-ante stage became less important. On the contrary, presentations 
about the future, expectations and visions gained some predominance, at the expense of 
descriptions of the past. Expectations and demands at upper levels were prevalent, in both 
the private sector and the public sector. These were pivotal in follow-up procedures, often 
attracting great attention in mass-media reporting. In financial markets, ideas of opportunity 
costs and discounting were applied on a regular, frequent basis. The financial function of an 
organisation was not the major concern, rather an optimal trade-off between risk and return 





In many cases, output from an activity flow is received by users without a price being paid. 
Consequently, potential users do not make a choice where expected value-in-use is related to 
a value-in-exchange, a price.
16 Commonness is implied in the construction: you will get this 
from us but we do not require anything in return. Funds are supplied through vertical 
allocation. They are made available by somebody who finds something in the horizontal 
process so essential that individual power or willingness to pay should not be decisive. In 
any event, each ongoing horizontal process in itself, without prices and strict vertical 
procedures, has some controlling effects. After all, driving forces of individuals and their 
interaction normally mean something for rational accomplishment. Efficiency is supported 
and impulses are given for modifying activity orientation.  
An activity flow with prices has further control elements. An organisation designs an 
offer, and expected willingness and capacity to pay are decisive for product content. 
Potential users make a choice where expected value-in-use is related to value-in-exchange, a 
price, and to available alternatives. A two-way instrumentality is implied: you get a product 
from us, but only if you give us something we value. Efficiency and impulses for modifying 
activity orientation are promoted more forcefully, especially if processes are repeated period 
by period. In addition, prices may affect dimensions of activities. Accumulated surplus in the 
past set a first limit on what can be carried out.           
Vertical allocation is a strong control device. Units at different levels give and receive 
funds. Funds are transmitted downwards or upwards. They are supplied downwards if 
horizontal processes are regarded as significant or instrumental in some respect and self-
generated means are not on a par with this. Governmental appropriations, investments from 
owners in a company or allocations from group executives to divisions are typical examples. 
Units are drained – upwards – when what was generated at one level is made available at a 
higher level. Degrees of financial interconnections between vertical levels vary. Two levels 
in a hierarchy may be strongly integrated or rather self-sustained. One or several levels in a 
                                                            
16 The distinction between value-in-use and value-in-exchange is notorious and goes back at least to ancient 
times and Aristotle.     
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hierarchy are centres of transmittances, and these levels may vary over time in a particular 
organisation. Forms of vertical transmittance are established through explicit decisions but 
occasionally also through pure evolution. Without special design considerations and due to 
developments in sub-units, increased or decreased financial interdependence may be induced 
gradually between levels in a hierarchy.  
Pure allowances constitute another financial source. They connect strongly to some part 
of an individual horizontal process. Public subsidies are allotted to organisations and people 
and are given irrespective of any formal vertical relation. Benefactors contribute to 





Vertical transmittances are dependent on how principals in the vertical line regard horizontal 
processes, the character of their involvement, the financial capacity that is available for them 
and the outlook of these processes. For some activity flows, external interests and needs are 
basically similar over time, but volume and form may change. For other activities, the 
significance of certain horizontal processes may shift continuously or abruptly. Great 
challenges may follow for an organisation, including new conditions in terms of activity 
orientation and target groups. Through methods of accumulating and transmitting capital, the 
horizontal outcome during one period can affect horizontal processes in the following 
periods. Surpluses are made directly available within a generating pay-driven unit, or funds 
are allocated to function-driven units based on performance in other respects. 
Mainly, function-driven organisations are financed through periodical capital input. To 
some extent, capital may be accumulated. Connections are weak to individual users and their 
output. Nowadays, pseudo-pricing is common, perhaps combined with periodical input. For 
some function-driven organisations, opportunities for horizontal substitution are small 
because activities are lastingly indispensable, potentials for rationalization are relatively 
limited and operating revenues are only a fraction of total funds. Relationships between 
decreases in resources and performance are difficult to capture in a meaningful sense, 
including prospects and capacity for the future. An organisation and surrounding parties are 
exposed to uncertainties for variables that are not easily defined. Allocation is often based on 
some reception of needs and how these are satisfied – for example, purely verbal goals, data 
about the scope of activities and the expressed views of users. A fundamental issue is how 
allotments are related to the development of incoming prices. This determines how costs and 
price risks are borne at different levels in an organisational hierarchy. 
In business life, principals in the vertical line may have direct intentions with function-
driven units but these units are not lastingly indispensable. On the contrary, such a function-
driven unit fulfils a function for a greater whole but substitutes often exist. Selection is 
possible in some time horizon but may have repercussions on other units. Resources are not 
allocated to such a function-driven unit only on the basis of the merits of the unit as self-
sustained. Various forms of pseudo-pricing are common, sometimes combined with vertical 
transmittances. 
In the public sphere, many control approaches are applied in order to get functions 
accomplished. Pseudo-commercial models are used, or assignments are given to pay-driven 
organisations that are privately owned. Normally for these suppliers, functions are satisfied 
to the extent that there is willingness and capacity to pay. Basically, revenues in these cases 
are determined by what funds the public buyer makes available, and their risks are affected 
by the durability of their relations to the buyer. In these cases, a complex vertical structure  
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stands above activities. Some parts are dependent on periodical allotments that are shaped by 
accounting concepts of public administration. Other parts have a direct connection to cash 
flows and the rate of return requirements in pay-driven organisations. Interaction between 
different control models becomes a key issue for the functions that are aimed at. 
Pay-driven units are based on the original capital input from founders and the subsequent 
non-periodical input that may have been determined by special decisions. Often, the most 
essential source is capital accumulated through retained earnings, period by period. Financial 
benefit is related to individual input. Normally, individual shares represent transferable 
values. Basically, vertical principals of pay-driven organisations are in the business for the 
sake of surpluses, but of course their motives may be related to specific horizontal processes 
as well. The alternatives of developing or winding up can be evaluated for a unit irrespective 
of other units. Selection is important, as well as competitiveness. 
For transfer-driven organisations, principals in the vertical line have no direct interest in a 
specific horizontal process, with the possible exception of markets where transfers and 
financial transactions are made.  Their focus is basically on transfers of equities or parts. The 
selection of equities is a core activity. In addition, adapting organisations in order to 
facilitate transfers may be a main interest. Shifts in ownership may take place because 
transfers are possible and without any particular relation to horizontal structures for the 






In many cases, large groups of individuals are the ultimate vertical power – either as citizens 
with voting rights in a democracy, as owners of shares in a corporation or as participants in 
collective saving. They are not organized and they are at a considerable distance from 
significant activities. Special organisations are founded to handle the interests of individuals 
in such cases. Thoroughly penetrated and common goals are difficult to find. As a result, the 
executives as well as individuals concerned have room for the interpretation of collective 
meaning. Each individual may express views about each limited side of the economic issue, 
irrespective of what other views s/he may have about this issue in other contexts.  
In addition, savings institutions may be a last vertical power in cases where they have an 
ordinary horizontal position as supplier in relation to investors and savers as customers. 
Several steps are possible. Savings institutions are in turn customers of other organisations. 
For example, an institutional investor buys shares in private-equity-funds and may proceed 
with the same type of requirements as every big customer in the financial field. Events at the 
highest levels of the vertical structure take place in horizontal processes concerning financial 
organisations. Conditions are shaped in this way for organisations that are closer to many 
material functions and experiential functions.     
Thus, organisations with allocation as a main role will have funds at their disposal, either 
through business transactions or transmittances that are determined. Such units act at a 
distance from their ultimate principals or their customers. At the same time, they act at a 
distance from many horizontal core processes that, in the end, may be affected. They are 
themselves exposed to all the general mechanisms of organisations, including the need to 
appear attractive to other parties. This is true of public administration, where leading 
representatives are also representatives of political parties. It is also true of institutional 
investors. If not in any other context, ambiguous goals in such organisations will be 
sharpened into something that is not controversial from a professional point of view, a high  
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return on capital, considering risk and expected inflation. Sometimes, a smooth return is 
talked of as a realistic aim, no matter what the uncertainties are in underlying activities. 
Financial goals do not prevent institutional investor from expressing further restrictions on 
what corporations should do – so called external governance.        
Moreover, organised examiners, surveyors and professional observers have a distance to 
horizontal down-to-earth processes. Analyses at a distance concentrate on visible and 
measurable evidence that it is possible to communicate. Many units should be dealt with and 
compared. Analytical tools, especially with quantitative approaches, are appreciated. Some 
aspects are easier to quantify than others. Interpretations of crude or complicated numbers 
have many possible pitfalls. What seems to be an indication of improved productivity may 





In horizontal, vertical and diagonal processes, plans and outcome are compared with two 
kinds of reference levels: the needs of a unit and the potentials of a unit. Levels of need go 
back to external interests or the needs for the unit as such. External demands are primary. 
What needs to be achieved in order to satisfy essential parties, including principals, workers 
and those who may use output? External parties express demands with various degrees of 
clarity and power. Levels of potentials imply what it is possible to achieve. For function-
driven organisations, what combinations of functions and costs is it possible to reach? For 
pay-driven organisations, what combinations of product prices, wages and surplus is it 
possible to reach? Historically and externally based aims are often applied in order to 
approximate levels of needs and potentials. Thus, rate of return requirements and levels of 
risk are estimated with regard to what has previously been customary. Benchmarking with 
values from good examples provides levels of potentials for entire organisations or sub-units.  
Some interests and needs, first and foremost, are connected to financial functions and 
dimensions. Values-in-exchange between independent parties are crucial – for everything. 
Long periods of shifting price expectations may occur before a transaction is actually 
accomplished, but value-in-exchange at a particular moment and in a particular case is what 
counts, after all. For financial instruments, series of payments are the core. Amounts, risks 
and time are main variables. Relatively meaningful equivalent values for different points of 
time can be constructed, that is values of alternatives to make amounts available now or at 
any later point of time. In this case, time preference is relative rather than absolute. Risks are 
strictly connected to a separate unit. Levels of aversion vary. Alternatives are relatively easy 
to find, and search areas have no constraints in terms of specific interests and needs in a 
horizontal process. Financial principals may get a return either continuously or on individual 
transactions or investments. For them, with many investment opportunities, general price 
development is a natural reference for evaluating return, rather than prices that are of specific 
interest for a certain activity. They need concepts that represent general purchasing power 
and can provide a basis for comparisons for the past and for the future. It is not necessary to 
define a time perspective, but sometimes a limited period is predetermined, such as three or 
five years, which for example is true of private equity-firms or hedge funds.    
Many interests and needs concern material functions and experiential functions in general, 
including values-in-use of physical products and services, the meaning of daily activities and 
the utilization of human and physical resources. For products and prices in a market, 
potential buyers base their actions on their present view on the context of the product, 
expected value-in-use and alternatives. For function-driven organisations, on the other hand,  
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vertically transmitted funds require a perception from an organisational point of view on 
value-in-use and alternative uses of funds. It is not always meaningful to identify equivalent 
values for different points of time. Certain horizontal needs are urgent, and in such cases, 
time preference may be absolute, rather than relative. Many function-driven units, vertically 
financed, meet conditions of immediate performance. Critical functions and needs also 
concern the future, which is especially the case for functions with a physical and biological 
background. Many function-driven units are challenged to be able to satisfy needs that, year 
after year, are basically similar and constantly urgent, perhaps also increasing in volume. 
Often the search for alternatives is limited to particular elements of a specific horizontal 
process.  
For each organisation, functions and visions must take place within financial limitations 
that are determined either by market-driven flows, funds allocated or voluntary 
contributions. A lack of liquid assets constitutes the most absolute financial constraint. 
Legally cogent rules for items on the balance sheet and income statement, such as the rules 
for liquidation, in reality permit a somewhat greater scope for alternative action. For many 
organisations, the basis for covering financial needs and risks is their own generation of 
equity capital. For others, such needs are to a great extent covered by the funds allotted.  
 
 
Being  attractive  and  convincing ­  a  necessity  for  a  separate 
organisation  
 
In a way, relations to users of output are the most basic ones. Organisations, whether pay-
driven or function-driven, need to be attractive and need to convince people that they are. 
During the second half of the 20
th century, marketing, market strategies and marketing 
information systems developed. How do users think, how satisfied are they and to what 
extent do they have perceptions on what they want?  Gradually, considerable efforts have 
been made to identify the contexts of users and to adapt products, messages and systems to 
large or fragmented target groups. Products and commodified services have been developed 
to suit user contexts. Sometimes they are even tailor-made. Rather often, contexts as such are 
developed and communication with this aim may be as important as products in an original 
sense. Actually, for many organisations, marketing efforts of these kinds have no limits 
except costs. Investments in brands may be regarded in this perspective.       
Moreover, the shift upwards in vertical structures has induced a need to argue and 
convince. Those who supported the idea of so-called corporate governance have been 
successful, promoting such a development in stock markets. Similar tendencies have 
appeared in public administration due to developed systems and an increased need to 
prioritize.  
Mass-media processes have become a central governance and control issue. Organisations 
and their representatives adjust to this phenomenon partly by promoting ideas and concepts 
publicly, partly by developing defence strategies in case of threatening emergencies. Often, 
an essential part of both external and internal communication is a matter of convincing a 





In horizontal market processes, distinguishable output from a separate organisation is 
identified and a price is assigned to a product that has a function outside the organisation.  
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Values-in-exchange of this kind are self-evident and necessary in markets with parties that 
are financially separated from each other. In principle, potential users have options. 
However, it is less and less obvious that prices can always be connected to what is core 
output with regard to the functions of many users. Newspapers used to be one example, IT-
services provide many recent examples. Nor does output in a limited, concrete sense always 
play an autonomous role for a user, and providers´ influence on user context may be a 
decisive prerequisite. 
For many reasons, relatively few costs, actually fewer and fewer, are tied to a specific 
product. Many product items share activities and resources, which is also often an important 
condition for each of them. Complex cost relationships call for greater emphasis on higher 
levels of product hierarchies. However, pricing and inventory valuation require explicit 
values for low levels. The view that such values have a meaning seems to be very established 
among many buyers and surveyors. Actual values-in-exchange have often been the basis of 
accounting systems, but from the 1920s and 1930s opportunity cost and opportunity values 
became more common.  
Purely function-driven organisations are based on the following notion. A task should be 
carried out. In principle, a potential user does not necessarily have a choice. This task is not 
symbolically reduced to separate and observable parts with a value-in-exchange at the 
transition from producer to user. A value-in-use arises in two steps, a fact which is not 
quantified. However, periodic reviews require a matching of costs with what has been 
accomplished, and then estimations of output are natural, and more or less well-defined. 
Pseudo-commercial units and commodification have become very common, as previously 
noted. Strictly identifying output, and assigning prices, is needed in these cases. Values-in-
exchange of a pseudo-type must be assigned to some distinguishable and observable objects. 
Sometimes, internal relations have other elements than transactions between two parties that 
are totally separated from each other, even though impressions may be different at first sight. 





Accounting measures can be interpreted as signifiers in relation to something signified. Their 
construction can be seen as symbols in relation to events and states outside the accounting 
system.
17 Furthermore, accounting data have an autonomous legal and contractual role in 
events as such, for example as formal bases for dividend decisions and taxation. Accounting 
representation is fairly easy to interpret when book entries directly connect to an individual 
series of well-defined transactions. However, data may refer to present or future 
circumstances that are not an actual, specific part of a process for an individual organisation. 
Then, perception of processes and states and their sequences may serve as a reference point 
for interpreting amounts and book entries but not necessarily with an unambiguous result.   
Naturally, income concepts and value concepts for financial entities originate from pay-
driven organisations. Measures are based on market prices and series of payments from a 
certain unit´s point of view. In this context, concepts can be given a meaning irrespective of 
functions and dysfunctions outside the organisation. Measures imply a two-way 
instrumentality, a lack of commonness and a limitation of the role of each unit. Information 
                                                            
17 The concepts of ”signifier” and ”signified” refer to ideas from  linguistics, used later on in other academic 
fields, such as analyses of theatre plays. Within accounting, these concepts have been applied by MacIntosh.  
Ijiri uses a similar pair of concepts in The Foundations of Accounting Measurement, principals and surrogates.     
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on external effects in horizontal lines primarily serves as guidance for predictions of future 
payments. For function-driven units, conditions are different. However, “income”, “profit” 
and “value” have been commonly used names for any comprehensive financial measure. 
These terms can mean almost anything. Though, “income” or “profit” for function-driven 
organisations cannot be given a separate meaning irrespective of effects outside the 
organisation.  
Representation of horizontal events is a key accounting issue for pay-driven activities. 
Observed values-in-exchange on certain occasions for resources of a specific unit have been 
a traditional basis. A user perspective on resources has been dominant; resources have been 
acquired to fulfil a function in ongoing and continuous activities. What has already happened 
is pivotal, but a glance at the future is also made. Maintaining existing capacity may be the 
aim of evaluation. Predictions of exchange values are made, for instance when accounts 
receivable are written down. In addition, evaluation may be based on future series of 
payments that are caused by existing resources. However, tying a value to each specific 
cooperating resource may be difficult or logically impossible. 
As an alternative, “fair values” might be the idea. General market prices and market 
values outside an organisation can be the starting point of evaluations. Some unit-specific 
events have not taken place and possibly will not even take place later on. According to such 
an approach, values-in-exchange are gathered from other contexts than the particular case, 
and explicit particular aims of a resource are disregarded. A separable part of company 
resources is evaluated on the perception of how and to what price this resource should be 
traded if there was a mutual exchange between two parties. Estimated prices are booked.  
Exchange perspective approaches are common, not least within the vast financial field. 
For many instruments of standardised and rather substitutable types, prices are quoted 
continuously. Managing securities, in a broad sense, and values-in-exchange are the core of 
business. Basically, securities are separable from each other. In that case, accounting that is 
based on currently possible exchange values gives a fairly good representation, in contrast to 
those situations when instruments are not very liquid. Then values-in-exchange exist but less 
frequently. Or traded instruments are less standardised. This means that a singular quoted 
price is more difficult to interpret as a representation in accounting. In certain cases, market 
prices do not exist. In those cases, instruments are evaluated by models that require 
assumptions about future-oriented variables, such as expected earnings, expected cash flow 
or volatility. Thus, there is no real state to signify at all. Measures are pure constructions 
based on some more or less well-defined premises. 
Relationships between income concepts and horizontal events are especially problematic 
when resources are valued on market conditions despite the fact that they are included in a 
certain functional context with certain intentions. Resources have been acquired, not to be 
disposed of but to be combined with other resources in order to produce products that will 
give ongoing revenues. This way of combining resources should give something more than 
all the resources separately. Market evaluation is governed by the notion that separable parts 
would command a certain price if market relations were prevailing. Thus, evaluation is made 
irrespective of the particular context and intentions and of the special dependencies for 
resources that are distinctive features of a case. Market prices of separable parts do not mean 
a good representation of an ongoing process where specific transformation is in focus. 
Rather, it represents value development for resources in their general context. Specific 
processes of activities, input and output are not basically supported.  
Thus, accounting based on market prices presumes hypothetical perceptions in the 
representation of a company involved. Some separable part of company resources could be 
traded between independent parties. Often no exchange takes place. Pricing conditions that  
31 
 
are not specifically tied to the company in question may be observed for many types of 
relations in more or less well-defined markets. For separate resources, a price is established 
for each transaction and occasion with impulses from many different contexts. Market-price 
accounting pinpoints separate resources and prices that are quoted at each point of time, 
rather than combination and transformation as such. Thus, a change perspective is an 
underlying factor and alternatives to current use are important. In extension, resources could 
be included in other contexts, contributing to various new alternatives. Ultimately, resources 
have many possibilities and interdependencies, and there is an endless number of gradual 
alternatives, though basically no alternative exists at the global level from a biological and 
physical point of view. 
Often public income measures are a mix of components. Towards the end of the 20
th 
century, values-in-exchange from specific events tended to be less dominant than before – 
more often, evaluations were based on market prices and models. One part of the 
background was standard setters´ ideas of information usefulness. They seemed to perceive 
that such values served equity analyses, or should do. In turn, volumes of analyses had 
increased previously, due to the fact that trading with shares and companies had become an 
autonomous activity in business life. A change perspective on business structures and 
values-in-exchange had become an important element of vertical processes. Public 
accounting during the last decade of the 20
th century captured these tendencies and promoted 
them. Thus, the use of resources perspective was no longer a dominant principle to the same 
extent as before in financial accounting. 
International reporting standards have undoubtedly become very complicated from a 
technical point of view. They require expert knowledge far from traditional, important 
business competence of different kinds. Thus, a huge market for consultancy has evolved. 








The growth of an organisation is dependent on the nature of the horizontal flow and how the 
vertical process is connected to this flow.  
For pay-driven and transfer-driven organisations, possible in- and outflows, their time 
pattern, uncertainty and risk are key variables. Growth is essential in several respects. For 
purely pay-driven and transfer-driven units, share value-in-exchange is significant. Growth 
in cash flows that are available for dividends has a strong impact on this value. In turn, such 
growth requires that activities are expanded and rearranged. Consequently, the development 
of existing business areas and the search for areas and new geographical markets are strong 
driving forces. Selection and pricing are two powerful mechanisms; prospects in terms of 
revenues and costs set limits for future development. Expansion is organic or is built on 
mergers and acquisitions – financial control concepts and processes in the decades around 
the year 2000 tended to support market transactions. For pay-driven organisations, financial 
capacity is based on previous values-in-exchange for input and output, surpluses in 
horizontal processes and attraction on vertical principals and lenders through expected 
surpluses. Exceptions are possible.     
For purely function-driven organisations, a specific horizontal process is the starting point 
and aim. At each point of time, needs and demands to satisfy have a certain scope. If groups  
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of users increase naturally, growth may be required too, as is the case with schools and 
health care when the population increases. In addition, function-driven organisations may 
make efforts to reach new groups in new ways. Or they may try to utilize their competence 
in other contexts by developing new horizontal processes on pay-driven grounds. For 
function-driven organisations, cost targets are relative easy to determine for output in cases 
where technology and volume are the main determinants of costs. Targets are much less 
well-founded for other tasks that are difficult to define, especially general functions for an 
organisation as such. In those cases, targets will have the form of discretionary limits, period 
by period.  
Focusing on output, piece by piece, was not the classical way to dimension function-
driven units. Rather, the approach was to identify an activity that had some external 
functions outside the unit and determine what resources were needed. With such an 
approach, the value of some vague functions for somebody has to be judged, as well as the 
resources needed and the possibility and willingness to allocate such funds. Ventures into 
something new may be problematic for function-driven units with narrow cost limits, unless 
they involve rationalization or income opportunities. At the development stage, costs are 





There are many controlling subjects within a financial unit: often a board at a distance from 
activities, central executives that are closer to activities but still at a distance, and other 
managers and all employees in sub-units. Often, central executives play a key role in the 
design of internal systems: objects, measures and control processes. Board members, beyond 





Entire financial entities and their organisational parts are ordinary objects of financial control 
systems, as well as other objects that cash flows can be related to, such as output delivered, 
capital projects and customers. For organisational units, measures relate to points of time or 
periods – a year, a quarter of a year, a month and so on. Periodical amounts are calculated in 
advance or afterwards. Normally, a system of periodical requirements and reviews is at 
work. Responsibility reports in terms of income and costs are important as a basis for 
vertical control. In addition, control may aim at horizontal processes. Product-costing, 
calculations for customers, sales reports and capital-project computations represent a 
horizontal process. 
Each organisation, at each point of time, has its combination of vertical and horizontal 
control instruments. In large organisations, structures may be highly complicated. Often, 
hierarchies are built on several important activity dimensions, not just one or two; 
furthermore, parallel horizontal elements are not few in number. A standpoint is needed on 
what dimension to prioritize in explicit systems and control processes.  
Top-level executives normally make design decisions about organisation-wide 
information-handling systems that practically put constraints on each internal information 
user – despite the fact that systems per se have few technological restrictions and that two-
way communication is feasible from this point of view. The early computer-based systems in 
the 1960s and 1970s meant that central specialist functions of an organisation were the  
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providers of reports from systems they had developed. Since then, user involvement has 
been natural and local influence on systems and use has increased dramatically. 
Nevertheless, vertical patterns and the special position of top-level executives have to a large 
extent remained, despite technological opportunities. Technologic changes have even 
improved possibilities of downward control, if that is what is wanted. In addition, the views 
of top-level representatives, especially executives, constitute prerequisites for those below 





A board, if any, and central executives have to consider if and how internal objects, 
measures and requirements should be linked to external demands. Objects as such must be 
chosen with this aspect in mind, possibly paying regard to what objects would facilitate 
external understanding and evaluation. Furthermore, measures and targets may be designed 
as a replica of external components. For example, there are various ways to formally 
consider the rate of return on equity requirements from owners. 
Since the last few decades of the 20
th century, many forces have induced connections 
between public and internal measures of companies. Mostly, public measures have been the 
determining factor. One expression of this development is that external periodical measures 
frequently became the norm for the design of internal periodic measures. Beyond this, 
periodical measures of a traditional kind lost some of their weight internally. Instead, value-
based measures attracted more attention: calculated values of the same kind as at any 
evaluation of companies and shares. Such values for separable parts of organisations became 
more important in internal control as well. As previously noted, public measures for entire 
organisations have tended to be designed with an exchange perspective. They may therefore 
be difficult to reconcile with internal measures that should be relevant for ongoing and 
lasting horizontal activities.  
To a varying degree, internal control systems record and react to variations in the 
surroundings. Not only in the private sector, processes for the evolution and design of 
control systems of an organisation often mean that external functional modes and tendencies 
are captured and built into the system. In this way, organisations not only create 
opportunities to satisfy immediate demand but they also tend to strengthen certain outside 





For an organisation, requirements can run permanently or temporarily. They may be based 
on needs or potentials outside the absolute levels of legally compelling limits. Defining a 
measure is in itself a form of requirement. Beyond this, a level can be stated. For function-
driven units, concrete and manifest cost requirements will exist parallel to more vague 
requirements of functions and needs. For pay-driven organisations, targets that are based on 
needs can be set at least with an indirect connection to the perspective of a financial 
principal. In some cases, financial markets induce distance between principals and 
organisation. In other cases, financial entities have very close and manifest relations to 
allocating organisations or individuals as direct financial principals. They have to consider 
more or less well-founded and clear declarations from these principals regarding targets for 
rates of return, income or costs.  
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Internal systems  make certain connections between vertical and horizontal processes. 
Essentially, explicit vertical requirements have some relation to what is expressed as 
possible and desirable horizontally. A tangible example is product-costing techniques for 
recognizing resources in the horizontal line and vertical demands. Variable costing methods 
include only costs easily assignable to individual products. They basically exclude common 
capacity costs and they require targets apart from the cost calculation as such. Full costing 
methods include common costs and also include a component for interest on equity capital. 
Further components for opportunity costs may be added, which, however, is not usual in 
systems for continuous evaluations. Target costing can be seen as an advanced form of 
connections between horizontal processes and vertical processes. Cost levels are already 
determined at development stages, so that, later on, both buyers and financial principals will 





Different partial processes within an organisation need to be linked up. In addition, an 
organisation and actors in the surroundings have connections that need to be considered. 
Internal processes that are related to financial control consist of a number of sub-processes 
that involve actors in various combinations. They have no unambiguous relation to a simple 
hierarchy, even if, to some extent, they are based on pure formal delegation. They have 
horizontal and diagonal elements. Some sub-processes are manned on a representative basis. 
Linking sub-processes is often a difficult task, which is crucial for those who have fairly 
strict responsibility in a hierarchy. 
Those who work in an organisation will, through employments and commitments, 
represent a common interest – a “we” that includes “everybody”. The perspectives of this 
“we” can conflict with perspectives of sub-units and of individuals that have their own 
genuine interests. Often, central executives and specialists make great efforts to reach 
vertical linking by creating common values and reinforcing this all-including “we”. Various 
forms of communication, systems and campaigns have been normal tools in an epoch when 
short-term relations and not very lasting affinities are typical. During the past few decades, 
this development has been one of the major changes in governance procedures.    
Incentive systems with variable components provide another tool for congruence between 
the aims of employees and the goals of an organisation and its owners. Many variants are 
possible. Employees get remuneration in proportion to activity outcome in various respects, 
for example some earnings measure. They get shares, options or fund units, and value 
increases, if any, will fall to them. They get remuneration as if they had had shares or 
options, and value increases had fallen to them. They are invited to acquire shares or options 
through the employing company, and they can take advantage of increases in values-in-
exchange, if any. Incentives are tied to estimated model values when actual values-in-
exchange do not exist, for example for a sub-unit. Thus, incentive systems with variable 
components aim at making the actions of subordinates congruent with the interests of 
superior principals. Beyond this, potential employees at high levels that are competitive can 
be offered attractive working conditions and the possibility to build up private capital. For 
some constructions, the borderline between employee and owner may be diffuse through a 
two-sided role. This, in turn, concerns accounting foundations because the distinction 
between owners and an organisation with employees is fundamental.  
Influence on basic perspectives of central executives is an important aspect of incentive 
systems. As a matter of fact, this is a primary purpose. Thus, central executives may  
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represent more or less the same financial logic as financial principals do, rather than an 
activity-oriented and separate logic tied to an organisation as such. Generally speaking, 
financial incentives have been much more decisive for both planning and running operations. 
However, during the last decades of the 20
th century, great efforts were also made to achieve 
an orientation towards broader goals, particularly by means of balanced scorecards. 
Nevertheless, financial measures and key variables have been dominant, which has been 





Individual and collective needs and desires are the ultimate bases for the requirements placed 
on organisations. Outcome, on the other hand, is determined by how a certain potential is 
utilized. In principle, a discrepancy between the two is natural. Vertical tensions arise. 
Requirements from a generation of savers may conflict with working conditions for a 
younger generation. Or financial limits for function-driven activities set by a governmental 
authority may not be consistent with operational aims that are declared simultaneously.  
At the highest vertical levels, needs and external interest are in focus. At the highest well-
organized level, decisive premises are established. Some room for choice is available, almost 
at some discretion, but once premises have been settled, they will serve as rather rigid 
reference points for a process downwards. Income requirements that have been deduced 
from historical levels in stock markets or targets in cost-cutting campaigns may serve as 
examples. Actors at high levels are at a distance. Mobility for them concerns structural 
transactions and transfer-driven activities and general ideas of how control should be 
implemented in operational and functional units. Top-level actors are not able to develop 
horizontal processes in any deep sense, nor should they even try to do so normally. They can 
influence ongoing activities through demands on subordinated units. Operative interventions 
are of very general types. Top-level views may contain contradictions that appear obvious 
only when they come closer to operations.   
A hierarchy contains various levels where room for action appears and is consumed. 
Mobility is most valuable at those levels that have an essential, potential impact on 
horizontal flows, either pro-actively or through adaptive behaviour, for core activities and 
relations forwards and backwards. It is not equally important at other levels. Mobility is 
dependent on capacity for resistance. Each level has its exposure to variations in financial 
development and repercussions of exogenous factors. Continuous mobility at a certain level 
is conditioned by how financial variations hit the unit and to what extent the unit is equipped 
to meet such variations. Operational consequences may vary. Capacity for resistance, for 
example through reserves, fulfils a purpose especially at levels where mobility has an 
essential impact on horizontal flows and facilitates adaptive behaviour, in both the short and 
the long term. At each level, people tend to regard their own reserves as motivated, but not 
reserves at lower levels. In accordance with this idea – and due to the shift of vertical 
processes upwards – group-level reserves now tend to be strongly questioned.  
The nature of tensions varies with the types of connections between principals and 
horizontal flows. For pay-driven organisations, tensions may mean a shift of burden to other 
parties, for example customers, but in pure cases this could be a secondary problem for 
principals and a primary problem only if a series of future payments is affected. It is possible 
that customers may counteract. For function-driven organisations, the effect itself on the 
horizontal flow should be a primary concern for principals. Nevertheless, in practice the 
scope and character of activities may be affected, especially due to the needs of the financial  
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limits. Often, counteractions are weaker. Furthermore, selection is not possible to an 
essential extent. Tensions tend to remain and grow.         
Shifts from the controllability concept to an outcome focus were one of the most decisive 
and multifaceted changes in financial control during the 20
th century. For a long time, the 
controllability concept was dominant in management literature and practice: an organisation 
and its parts should concentrate on what can be influenced to a reasonable extent, and 
prevailing conditions are the obvious starting point for defining commitments, tasks imposed 
and risks to be borne.   
The status of the controllability concept weakened towards the end of the century. An 
outcome focus predominated: concentrate on the outcome strived for, link it with strong 
rewards and sanctions, do not make the relationship between resources and outcome a 
primary consideration, stimulate adjustments to factors that cannot be affected, restrict what 
are regarded as obstacles. Several currents of opinion worked along this line. Methods for 
achieving goal control became common during the second half of the 20
th century. Reward 
and bonus schedules received considerable attention, particularly since control at a distance 
had become an important phenomenon during the last decades of the century. According to 
the logic of the most intense and popular parts of the public debate, it was possible to relate 
guilt for deficient outcomes to actions of individual parties, and guilty individuals were 
preferably pointed out, regardless of controllability in its original sense. These tendencies 
increased towards the end of the century, at a time when interdependencies in economic life 
were increasing and parties that could act independently of each other were more difficult 





Reviews by auditors, year by year, are important for financial control. Despite all the 
discussions about independence, auditor can hardly have a neutral role. Primarily, they 
reinforce a vertical perspective at the cost of horizontal perspectives. After ownership and 
management had been separated around the year 1900, auditing was introduced as a tool for 
owners to monitor company and central executives. Auditors pay great attention to internal 
control in organisations, which in practice means emphasis on hierarchies and a vertical 
perspective.  
The question is then whether auditing work supports any particular vertical level. 
Fundamentally, this work is supposed to benefit high vertical levels – owners or potential 
owners – while real procurement and charging of costs occur at lower levels. In their 
marketing activities, auditing firms may be encouraged to point out other benefits than the 
value of review as such. At various levels, organisational representatives have certain 
tendencies to regard auditing as a tool for their own information needs. In actual fact, the 
contents of the structure and systems that auditors are obliged to review influence what 
vertical level they support. The general shift upwards during the past few decades has meant 
a gradual change. During the first years of the 21
st century, auditors have tended to support 
higher vertical levels than before, when the survival of organisations was a more important 
aim of systems. 
According to professional perceptions, statements in auditor´s report are the main output 
of auditing work. Conduct should comply with rules of reviews and communication that are 
reasonably well defined. Neither surveillance nor reactions are continuous. Despite 
interaction before publishing, it is preparers that are responsible for financial statements, not 
auditors. Auditors´ public comments, if any, are expressed in their own report. According to  
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other views on auditing, mainly outside the profession, the role includes important elements 
of approval and guarantee. Thus, there is a gap between professional perceptions and many 
perceptions in the surroundings. Basically, trust for the auditing profession is connected to 
images that in turn reflect stories told about actual events. Generally speaking, risks of 
sanctions are obvious.   They are dependent on how work has been conducted not only in 
relation to professional norms but also in relation to surrounding expectations. As a 
consequence, extended documentation has become a part of individual reviews.    
Auditors have to consider whether an organisation complies with compelling norms, 
especially reporting principles. Nowadays, both rules and business transactions are 
complicated. Moreover, auditors have to take a position on valuations that are based on 
presumptions about the future. Looking at past events is not sufficient. Thus, there are zones 
of possibilities for judgements of an auditor. They are made at a distance. When a relation 
between auditors and organisations extends over time, auditors acquire a capacity to argue 
with executives on a more symmetrical basis in terms of insights into activities. 
Besides organised examiners, supervising boards have regular duties. These organisations 
are part of public administration or private institutions with power to determine sanctions in 
a wide sense, not necessarily with direct reference to certain rules of law. Often, they have to 
judge whether organisations have complied with rather general system rules or not. In case 
of deviations, another type of norm defines when and how sanctions should be imposed. 
Overall supervision of financial institutions is important as well as the supervision of 
financial-reporting compliance for every kind of business groups. For supervising bodies as 
well, distance is an issue, normally greater than for an auditor. A thorough basis for decision-
making is required, especially about future-oriented judgements. Superficial descriptions 
close to the content of expressed norms tend to be a risk. International capital markets make 
surveillance systems extraordinarily complex.  
On certain occasions, examinations and supervision are starting points for purely legal 
cases. The outcome may then be affected by how descriptions and legal norm are connected 
to each other. Two approaches can be identified. According to one approach, descriptions as 
such are strongly influenced by legal norms that comprise statements at an abstract and high 
level about acceptable systems norms and possible sanctions. According to the other 
approach, descriptions or counter-arguments are influenced by an actual logic of activities in 
the organisation concerned but, in the end, norms will be fully applied. Thus, legal 
procedures will produce simple descriptions or more complicated ones that are closer to the 
logic of activities. In both cases, strictly legal judgement is not sufficient. Legal 
responsibility tends to converge towards individuals that, on the one hand, have had some 
room for action in an organisation and on the other hand, at the same time, have conducted 
some concrete acts within this frame. They may, for example, have signed a paper or 





The mass media play a key role for horizontal as well as vertical processes. Journalists and 
advisors of various kinds are important regarding the use of output – sometimes they affect 
the context of output and often the opinions of individual users and potential users. Those 
who review theatre productions and those who interpret the latest trends or give advice on 
savings products may have a considerable influence. The mass media are active in vertical 
processes too. Often they assume a role as representatives of individuals that formally have a  
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position at a high vertical level without being able to express an influential opinion or find 
desirable information.  
According to one view, the traditional mass media are a subordinate but demanding 
servant in the public arena. Their essential task is monitoring those in power and providing 
the public with valuable information. What is a problem for the mass media is also a 
problem for society. They fulfil an essential gate-keeping function. The mass media are 
needed to counteract tendencies towards incongruence between the acts of those in power 
and the well-being of people in general. According to other views, however, the mass media 
are driven by interests and forces in professions and organisations mainly in a similar way 
most professionals are. The mass media play a role as subject in an eternal action drama: 
chasing attention among potential receivers of information flows that are more and more 
fragmented. Gate-keeping tends to be an obstacle for information flows that do not suit 
professional interests 
The mass media are at a distance from events and organisations to be depicted and, with 
constraints in terms of time and costs, they should tell a story one step further for viewers, 
listeners and readers that may be accessible at an even greater distance. The pictures of 
events received by ultimate recipients depend on their pre-views, constructed impressions 
and transformations thereof. Ambiguous circumstances must be reduced by a mass medium 
to something more unambiguous that is easy to communicate in order to function and attract 
attention. Often, high vertical levels are in focus. These are relatively easy to observe and, 
moreover, relatively well-known actors and positions are involved. Internal processes are 
described most superficially, often for very short periods of time. As a consequence, so-
called scandals are depicted with a rather uncomplicated view on events, which is partly due 
to the fact that news coverage is extensive at early moments when much still remains to be 
investigated. 
Various kinds of media – TV, radio, morning papers, evening papers, business journals 
and sites on the internet – have different profiles in terms of content, expressions and 
recipients. Some give visual and phonetic fragments that are almost dramatised. Others have 
greater space, in terms of texts or audiovisual means, and maybe ambitions to treat subjects 
in a more penetrating and neutral way, but often they are able to convey only a few selected 
main thoughts within complicated areas. Normally, the media that have professionally 
defined target groups limit themselves to rather strict and professional frames. Some media 
are oriented toward sensationalism. Thus, recipients create a coherent picture that is based on 
all these fragments. In turn, this is important for what views are developed in societies and 
for how economic functions work and develop. Structures of internet flows, and other 
conditions for gate-keeping, provide a basically different basis for many vertical and 





Ultimately, control systems should be viewed in relation to the material and experiential 
functions of people, the operational functions of organisations, finance functions and various 
external functions of larger systems. The basic character of these functions is vague and 
mostly difficult to operationalise. However, the impact of control systems on these functions 
is conceptually essential. It represents intentions and effects of a first order. Underlying 
conflicts of interest and views are common, which is reinforced by the fact that various 
interests of a certain human being are split between many organisations in a non-coherent 
way. Distributional conflicts and ethical dilemmas are unavoidable.   
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Introducing money into societies meant a dramatic change in possible forms of allocation: 
a new albeit very crude instrument. Organisations and professionals made instruments 
develop, which improved allocation and follow-up processes remarkably. However, 
instruments also tended to have less contact with the original intents and effects of the first 
order. They could fulfill a mission of that order but, in addition, they tended to become ends 
in themselves. Financial control system in the early 21
st century can be regarded from this 
point of view.  
Rules for measuring, for decision-making and for financial constructions are developed. 
They tend to be ends in themselves, even when they are not legally cogent. They represent 
intentions and effects of a second order. Accounting measurement is one example. 
Achieving the numbers measured may be the decisive factor, rather than objectives in any 
deeper sense. “What gets measured gets done” – fortunately and unfortunately. It is almost 
always possible to count – conceptual meaning, however, is another matter. Here, too, lies a 
dilemma. Those factors that are fundamental but not meaningfully operationalised are easily 
neglected in favour of peripheral factors that are quantified. Efforts to satisfy the demands of 
interested parties can extend so far that intentions are not achieved, precisely for that reason.  
In practice, certain institutions reinforce second-order intentions and effects, for example 
institutes for credit rating, customer-satisfaction indices, employee-attitudes scaling and 
various ranking lists.  
The first two orders may be difficult to apply. Especially in those cases, methods and 
processes, as such, can also become ends in themselves or at least be of prime importance. 
Thus, they represent a third order of intentions and effects: how to certify certain states, how 
to determine auditor independence, how to measure customer satisfaction or political 
opinions, how to arrange contacts between the mass media and organisations. We cannot do 
more than this – we have applied procedures in the way we should. Organisations develop 
competence for managing such processes. An organisation that is highly sensitive to external 
demands may even develop, as its decisive competence, an ability to handle the 
communication process, as such, in which organisational performance meets external 
interests. Organisations that are devoted to third-order intentions and effects, or dependent on 
them, have become very common: consultancy firms, certification institutes, boards of 
governance structures and hedge funds. All these organisations, again, – at a remarkable 
distance from ultimate horizontal processes – have their separate self-interest and effects that 
are more or less valuable in a wider context.   
The very existence of processes, and processes as such, may be a main concern, beyond 
their actual use as instruments for first and second orders. Thus, a fourth order of intentions 
and effects is established. References are made to the fact that there is a process to talk, 
communicate and convince, almost irrespective of background and particular effects. 
Moreover, those who are familiar with processes in certain fields have a very strong focus on 
specific procedures. To a great extent, professional knowledge and identity is related to 
certain views about this. Sometimes, such values are the main ingredients of story-telling 
structures.  
I regard the mass-media processes as so decisive that I identify a fifth order of intentions 
and effects. What would things look like in a mass-media perspective? Some professions are 
establishing processes from that point of view. Symbioses of opinions become common. 
Parties benefit from sharing each other´s opinions, or at least sharing the interest of the 
fourth-order intentions and effects. The mass media represent a form of external control in 
addition to internal control systems that are applied within organisations. It is reasonable to 
think that public dramas stimulate extensions of expensive rituals and formal systems in 
society and organisations. Both political and commercial organisations can go a long way in  
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this direction. Mass-media output has an immediate use value for consumers looking for 
entertainment, as a part of their lives separately from everything else. Obviously, this aspect 





At the organisational level, subjects consider and interact with other units and individuals, 
controlling their own activities. Measures are taken with short- and long-term consequences 




The basic condition for each handling process is the structure and control system on each 
occasion. Financial realities and ambitions were undoubtedly driving forces of long-term 
developments in structure and control systems during the 20
th century. Many similar 
tendencies, albeit with a certain shift in time, can be found in business corporations, public 
administration and non-profit organisations in the private field. Financially-driven 
restructuring processes were common in all fields, making organisations less permanent. In 
public sphere, this was a matter of handling specific functions within the frames that taxes 
allowed; basically, expressed aims were not changed or were even sharpened. 
In business life, changes in forms were profound. The shift of influence upwards in 
vertical processes led to an emphasis on volatile security prices, expectations and predictions 
of exchange values. Ideas for optimizing within separate and defined formal boundaries were 
strongly established.  Relevant risk was related to these ideas, not to the survival of 
individual organisations. This became true for many non-financial companies and mostly for 
the growing number of financial organisations. All these organisations have their own 
separate risk, but some risks are shared with other organisations through many 
interconnections. For many of them, and most obviously for transfer-driven companies, 
expectations and exchange values are of crucial importance for mobility. Volatility is 
potentially strong, due to processes for public expectations and trading conditions and is not 
necessarily related to fundamental states. In rising markets, positive expectations make it 
natural to gain from optimizing with a certain view on risks and other traditional driving 
forces in business. At the same time, potential fluctuations in exchange values and public 
expectations expose financial institutions to the risks of sudden decline and immobility. 
Thus, expectations, potentially volatile values-in-exchange of shares and risks that are 
related to shares became the foundation of impacts on companies. The risks not to survive, 
financial power and mobility at group level were no longer a main consideration. For non-
financial activities, both public financial reporting and views on group financial structures 
expressed this development. Capital structures should be optimized, not targeted with regard 
to group and company survival. Explicitly and implicitly, the importance of groups in the 
previous meaning decreased. In addition, the identity of organisations changed and was split 
up. Organisations as such could have a turbulent life, while brands and identity went another 
and separate way.  
A few decades ago, theoretical concepts like “a nexus of contract” had appeared as 
detached labels of a living organ. Later on, they seemed fairly descriptive. Ties, backwards 
and forwards, were less strong and durable, including personal ties. Operational 
interdependencies within group were less important. With regard to transfer opportunities, 
the aim could even be to avoid them. Many organisations narrowed their operations, though  
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sometimes on a broader geographical scale, and each activity was more directly connected to 
separate financial conditions. In developed networks, the way of relating visions and ideas to 
resources is different from that for hierarchies. Lateral coordination is required; basically, 
decentralisation in an established hierarchy is not possible. Each unit has to play its role in 
the network and, at the same time, those who have mobility at their disposal may exercise 





Basically, the needs of many functions remain rather unaltered in society. New functions are 
added. Other needs and wishes decline. Some functions can be fulfilled in new ways. Thus, 
patterns of varying importance are changing. In part, demands are profoundly conditioned by 
what is being offered. Large and small innovations are introduced in terms of both output 
and production technology; productivity tends to increase in many fields. In particular, 
technological breakthroughs may have considerable effects in many respects. 
Each organisation needs to satisfy current functions and faces the challenge of 
developing: to utilize observable tendencies and, very exceptionally, to be a leading actor for 
general developments in society. To an essential degree, external processes of importance 
change in a rather tacit way. User contexts are transformed so that the output of a certain 
organisation gradually gets a different role, for example when technological or social 
changes take place. General increases in customer focus may restructure demands, and, 
consequently, all the required competences are no longer at the disposal of a certain 
organisation. The prerequisites of resource provision can change continuously or 
instantaneously, for example when wages, inflationary power or currency values reach new 
levels. An organisation may be affected by an increase in vertical pressures from above for 
other organisations with whom they are interacting. 
Activities of a certain organisation are conditioned by vertical and horizontal processes 
for other organisations both distant and near, and also by how these processes change. 
Requirements at the vertical top in various countries tend to level out. Wage formation and 
market competition cover extensive geographical areas. Pay-driven organisations have the 
option of selecting business areas and geographical areas. The effects on function-driven 
organisations are different. There is a real long-term challenge for all vertical actors that are 
concerned about certain aspects of a horizontal process in a certain geographical area. In 
particular, this is a vital problem for tax-financed and unavoidable needs, where costs of 





During a period of conduct, various activities within an organisation are carried out and 
immediate functions are fulfilled, or are close to being fulfilled. In advance, a certain period 
is considered in planning, budgeting, stock-price setting and so on. The outcome is reported 
step by step. As a result, what has happened during a period of conduct has further effects in 
an ex-post stage.  
At the ex-ante stage, an organisation relates vertical demands to plans for horizontal 
activities. This includes decisive strategic analysis or only a superficial observation about 
what is going on. The shifts upwards in hierarchies have meant an increased emphasis on 
expressed ambitions and intentions, not least in public communication. In stock markets, ex- 
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ante evaluations and re-valuations of future development attract considerable attention. Often 
predictions are mere extrapolations of past development, but sometimes they have solid 
foundations of their own. Furthermore, stock prices can be determined through rather pure 
trading elements, where volumes on certain occasions are based on predictions of values-in-
exchange in the short and long term.   
Requirements and expectations follow one another in a series before the conduct. One of 
the main functions of continuous information is to provide data enabling decision-makers to 
cope with the uncertainty that gradually diminishes as periods, initially distant in the future, 
come closer and closer to reality. Many of the most intense moments are just before the 
conduct period. Realisable plans, within financial frames, must be clarified. New products 
and development projects reach new stages just before launching. They are close enough to 
be considered in the stock market, and they are realistic enough to constitute assets according 
to accounting conventions.  
Of course, conduct is a very tangible matter for organisation and workers but, from the 
financial principals´ point of view, events could rather be regarded as a confirmation of 
expectations, and, exceptionally, as an impulse to take certain actions when expectations are 
not met. Nevertheless, formal reporting afterwards is extensive. In the majority of cases, 
relationships between efforts and costs of reporting on the one hand and utility on the other 
hand can be questioned. When an outcome is strongly unaccepted, past periods will attract 
far-reaching attention in the public forms described above. Exaggerations and imperfections 
of the individual case tend to be in focus, rather than fundamental issues and behaviour that 





Almost constantly, fundamentals justify the question of how an organisation should view 
long-term opportunities and requirements. Ultimately, room for action is at stake. The timing 
and magnitude of actions call for a standpoint. Generally speaking, two conflicting views 
with almost moral dimensions may be propounded. The first says that economic actions 
cannot wait – those who cut powerfully and early are the clever ones. Besides, it may be a 
good idea to take an extra step when insights about a crisis are established. According to the 
alternative view, it is a virtue not to allow plans to be constrained by financial aspects that 
may become urgent only later on. The ideal is to extend ambitions so that financial capacity 
is clearly strained and to give financial indicators a very broad context. What is the wisest 
line – and how far should one go?  
It is difficult to get a complete score of the state of activities. An assessment cannot be 
based merely on what is currently visible. Other variables to be captured are the ability to 
make choices in the future and exposure to uncertainty. Efficiency and productivity are vital 
concepts, but they are often extraordinarily difficult to depict with a sufficient range of 
nuances. They can be viewed either in terms of external output or with regard to the way in 
which organisations function in their entirety. Many resources can be quantified rather 
easily, while it is often hardly meaningful to calculate what is achieved, especially not in 
financial terms.  Nor can final results in some cases be given a meaning independent of the 
resources used.  
Financial problems become visible when there is a risk that certain financial limits will be 
exceeded. Information tends to be regarded as a kind of reality in itself. If so, it is interpreted 
not merely as one representation of processes and states. Formulated in terms of an 
individual occasion, problems that are identified often rest on narrow grounds in relation to  
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fundamental financial needs. Evaluations and actions may possibly focus on marginal 
changes or expressed expectations, for example in the form of budgetary values or implicit 
stock market variables, rather than absolute amounts and entireties. An impression of an 
immediate crisis may emerge in some cases but not in others, without any important 
fundamental differences. To some extent, “financial crises” are not problems in the same 
absolute sense from one occasion to another.  
An organisation may create room for action either through a solid financial position or 
through a manifest ability to master current financial emergencies. Strong processes centred 
on topical circumstances determine many actions, both externally and internally. Each 
evaluation appears in the context of immediate observations and comparisons. The perceived 
character of the occasion plays an important role for process atmosphere, for the formulation 
of a problem picture and for measures taken. Reference points inevitably differ from those 
that may seem natural in the light of a pattern of events constructed at a much later date. The 
starting point for a series of numbers is particularly decisive.  
Continuous measuring points have become increasingly frequent, and the intensity of 
actions has also increased. More actions are initiated, with repercussions far ahead in the 
future. In order to achieve congruence between activities and financial limits, a small set of 
steps is primarily considered on each occasion. The handling of certain demarcated variables 
becomes a determining factor. Financial limits tend to result in a temporary one-sidedness in 
actions, depending on what is currently considered movable and influential with sufficient 
potential. Fundamental issues, however, are extensive and complicated, especially in relation 
to the narrow problem pictures presented in the short-term reports that are an essential 
driving force in the management process. A break-through may possibly wait around the 
corner. For many organisations, however, problems are not temporary, nor are they solved 
by single actions when they become visible. It is in the nature of things that most actions 
only have, at best, a temporary impact on the financial situation. Fundamental cost processes 
continue and it is mostly a question of time before financial limits are again exceeded. 
Actions take place against a background of demarcated perspectives for activities and 
financial matters, rather than after analyses of connections in any deeper sense. Powerfulness 
is evident and based on the strong logic of control systems. A basic question is whether those 





The re-orientation of an organisation takes place with uncertainty as a main condition. It can 
be intentional, in the sense that processes start with the manifestation of a strategic will, 
founded on some financial basis; “core activities” are conceived in a new way, extended or 
narrowed. An explicit ambition is present to change relationships with one or more 
surrounding parties, with their separate interests. Activity extensions are changed: the 
number of parallel activity flows of a financial unit increases or decreases, or alternatively, 
more or fewer activity elements are integrated, forwards or backwards. What is done within 
the unit afterwards can have a different weight to others in a larger system. Experiences 
accumulated and institutional working modes can be more or less pivotal in relation to 
external activity elements or to individuals that primarily care about their own identity. 
All shifts in a unit´s function in relation to outside interests create new conditions for the 
dynamics of the larger system: where the driving forces are, where ideas grow up, from 
whose perspective they are evaluated. On whose conditions does the process operate: 
through forces inside or outside the individual organisation or through interplay with other  
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parties? Shifts can fundamentally affect the working mode of an organisation in the long run. 
In what respects does it take initiatives and in what respects does it adapt to moves by other 
parties? What are the impulses and with whom does it interact? In what way are certain 
potential employees attracted and others repelled? Thus, action capabilities are also affected. 
Dependence on external circumstances, financial and operational, is crucial for the individual 
unit. The narrower and stricter the framework, the less there is opportunity to play a leading 
and flexible role. Borderlines in the financial respect are important, in both the short and the 
long term. Financial functions can be handled either on a self-sustained basis or through 
being a part of a larger coordinated whole that either promotes the development of the 
particular unit or not.  
A shift in one unit´s relationship with other parties along horizontal or vertical lines may 
gradually appear, and may, initially, not even be easy to observe. Such a shift can be due to 
long-range changes in the surroundings and in ongoing actions that are possible within 
financial limits. Cost processes tend to lead to room for action of a permanent organisation 
standing in opposition to other interests, such as the financial principals´ opportunities to use 
resources in alternative ways, the output and prices offered to users and working conditions, 
including remuneration. Economic actions become less and less neutral. The interest in and 
the ability to see problems lurking around the corner vary. For some of those who defend an 
organisation on the basis of a special interest and special knowledge, it may be natural to see 
approaching problems and wonder what actual roles are emerging under new conditions. For 
decision-makers and observers with other ties, there is less reason to consider what functions 
could be fulfilled in a future society. For those who are assigned to express demands at a 
distance, without links with internal core processes, such aspects weigh rather lightly in 
comparison with the more obvious need to reduce costs. 
Often in resource discussions, conflicting and partly implicit ideas clash over what 
ambitions are consistent, what should be aimed for and what must, unfortunately, be 
abandoned. The opinions of various parties as to what should be given priority are governed 
by mental models that focus either on the actual working mode in an organisation or on a 
general and externally oriented view of functions and possibilities. Ways of achieving major 
cost advantages are proposed, and reference is made to financial necessity or to other factors. 
This may result in high priority for some external requirements, low priority for others, new 
de facto restrictions on activities or changes in working modes within the organisation.   
Each narrowed strategy causes particular risks in terms of the deteriorations of the long-
range capabilities of an organisation and its position in relation to surrounding parties. No 
one can know for sure what the society of the future will look like, and what functions and 
ideals would then prevail. What an organisation can offer later on should comply with 
functions that users, financiers and cooperating parties want at that point of time. This 
determines long-term attractiveness, vertically and horizontally. 
A more common set of impulses tends to hit many organisations, sometimes in a rather 
one-dimensional manner. When more people act more often in response to similar signals 
via similar processes, there are new prerequisites to establish an organisation of a special 
nature which can be justified as an independent unit and as a provider of output that is 
attractive and different from what other organisations achieve. In such processes, figures on 
one occasion may give a temporary picture in comparison with a long-term view. Elements 
of rhetoric are manifold. All this tends to be found in topical actions and strategic 
transformation, even in cases when long-term developments of revenues and costs are on 







Vertical and horizontal processes tend chiefly to promote two sorts of conformities. Firstly, 
organisations are tempted to carry out what gets a response from a strong and large enough 
number of users. In that respect, they are not unaffected by the current spirit of the times as 
expressed, for example, by professional observers. Secondly, organisations are drawn 
towards what satisfies the requirements of superior levels in hierarchies. There is significant 
system support for this attitude. Periodically, and in certain organisations, employee 
influence is strong. 
Often, organisational handling can be described as local optimization. Determination is 
strong within latitudinal boundaries. Moreover, handling may be time bound. Longitudinal 
boundaries play a role, tending to reinforce determination effects. However, areas affected, 
outside and inside an organisation, contain not only rapid and visible variables but also slow 
variables whose signs are less visible and more ambiguous in the course of events. To some 
extent, it is not known what areas are affected and what character they have; this is truly 
uncertain. Physical and biological processes are continuously running irrespective of whether 
they are sufficiently identified or not and irrespective of what the human views are. As I use 
the terms, local optimization is different from sub-optimization, which requires a defined 
entirety with some form of goal function. Such conditions are often not prevalent.   
Obviously, control systems affect important states inside and outside an existing 
organisation. Such connections may be conceived logically, but they are often difficult to 
observe empirically, especially at a distance. Actions take place against a background of 
constraining perspectives for activities and financial matters, rather than after analyses of 
connections in any deeper sense. Powerfulness is evident and based on the strong logic of 
control systems, not least for vertical requirements from above.  Often there is only 
circumstantial evidence that financial targets affect activities.  
Many savings result in rationalisation: the resources decline in relation to the output 
achieved and the functions supplied, without any deterioration. This is already controversial 
when it raises issues about working conditions and conflicts of interest. Furthermore, in most 
cases, both functions and costs change simultaneously. Even afterwards, it is often difficult 
to identify the impact on functions either in the short or in the long term. The role of actions 
taken may be unclear in a broader context. In the course of events, it is difficult to envisage 
unambiguous empirical links between distinct marginal saving requirements in a short-term 
perspective and the gradual effects on total activities. To a large extent, it is a question of 
logical interpretation: the consistency of various ambitions, what core processes and 
knowledge bases are decisive, how they are affected and how future opportunities are related 
to all these factors. When assessing future development, there is some room for everybody´s 
own logic, more or less deeply rooted in the specifics of the individual case. The balance 
between now and then is critical when choosing actions.  
Many professional organs act at a distance from ultimate activities and without close links 
with core processes that may be interrupted or destroyed as a result of a powerful impulse, 
for example requirements that conclude with cut-backs. In this sense, activities are hit 
somewhat at random by distinct requirements that are formulated at a distance. It is a kind of 
a shot in the dark, a kind of “principal’s hazard”, to connect to the language of prevailing 
economic theories. This is especially serious if core processes which are irreversible are 
affected. A strong outcome focus, combined with scarce resources, can lead to a certain lack 
of substance in strategies. Statements suitable for communication take over.  
Judged in a wide perspective, unambiguously valuable features of strict hierarchic 
discipline decline: Was it good or bad that somebody carried out a risky project in which  
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procedures and figures deviated from the required norms at the time, but where the outcome 
turned out to be decisive for an organisation in a 50-year perspective? Was it good or bad 
that somebody fulfilled every temporary demand and, as a result, let things stay the way they 
were? In both business life and public administration, long-term favourable processes have 
not been all that uncommon in cases where regular and formal control systems have been out 
of order.  
Positions of interest cannot be disregarded, nor the issue of equality. The issue of 
immediate functions for many people cannot be reduced to the aspect that many people do 
not like change. The decisive aspect for many parties is what happens to the functions that 
ultimately have to be satisfied. Will they deteriorate gradually and, if so, in what respect? 
Sometimes this seems very tangible and negative for an individual user, as when a physical 
product does not work or a service is considered unsatisfactory. Sometimes, the level of risk 
increases, without this becoming evident. Deterioration is especially problematic for 






Control systems that relate functions and visions to resources basically influence immediate 
activities and experiences. In addition, they affect transformation for the future: the ability to 
fulfil functions, deal with novelties, escape dysfunctions and adapt to disturbances. Control 
systems develop over time. Structure and control systems have always been changing, either 
through evolution or as a result of specific design decisions, and they are still changing. 
What is going on during the first decade of the 21
st century can be regarded as a further step 
in a long-term economic process of structure, control systems and specific activities. Below, 





By their operations, organisations satisfy certain material and experiential functions of 
individuals immediately or almost immediately, some of them very urgent. The need for 
immediate functions is one obvious and vital area of significance. Other such areas include 
what resources are used and how equitably resources and output are spread. Possible future 
functions and dysfunctions are also at stake for organisations and ultimately for human 
beings. 
Horizontally, a certain organisation has two-way relationships over time. To what extent, 
and how, is an organisation able to influence horizontal states and changes externally? What 
horizontal states and changes outside will have a determining effect on the organisation? An 
organisation meets individuals and other organisations backwards and forwards. They all 
have intentions and foresight. The horizontal position of an organisation in relation to these 
individuals and other organisations constitutes operational dependencies and uncertainties. 
The activities of one specific unit may be narrow or wide in a total value chain. This position 
is very important for the possibility of fulfilling functions that will be demanded in the 
future. Horizontal relations include processes in which organisations, individuals and nature 
are involved. Relationships are difficult to grasp. Operating modes and relationships are  
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uncertain in many respects. Nature has no known intentionality and no foresight. States of 
nature concern multiple interrelated areas of significance rather than a single area.
18  
Thus, actions today concern the conditions and outlook for horizontal activity in the 
future – for a single organisation and for larger systems, including natural resources. 
Structures and incentives are constructed to improve existing functions and their efficiency. 
Novelties are stimulated. But there is also vulnerability – for individuals, single 
organisations, nations, multinational areas and the entire global system. Actors and systems, 
at all these levels, are exposed to variations in horizontal events and have some adaptive 
capacity. Moreover, to varying degrees, each nation, organisation or individual is financially 
dependent in the sense that their financial functions are sensitive to variations in supplying 
financial markets and allocation systems. The possibility of such variations constitutes 
financial uncertainties for them and for larger systems and interacts with horizontal 
uncertainties. Again, at all these levels exposure to various operational, financial and total 





Over the past centuries, material living conditions have improved dramatically. Industrial 
and political developments from the mid-19
th century onwards meant fundamental changes 
that both raised material standards for the majority of people substantially and generated new 
constructions for the distribution of wealth. Control systems have contributed, especially by 
stimulating and promoting technological innovations and their diffusion processes. In this 
sense, the Western economic system and its financial control system have been strongly 
instrumental since the Industrial Revolution. 
Originally, control instruments were rather simple and directly connected to concrete 
aspects of organisational life. Early in the 20
th century, few plans and targets were developed 
for financial and accounting data. Nor were marketing efforts strong. By and by, opportunity 
and future-oriented costing were implemented. Predictions became more important and were 
impulses for courses of events, as a complement to a fait accompli. During the decades after 
the Second World War, budgetary planning at the organisational level was widely 
introduced. Marketing efforts were developed. Financial control systems developed over 
time. The development of instruments focused on methods and processes; professions also 
developed.   
Instruments continued to be developed. By and by, they became technically sophisticated. 
They captured more, but on the other hand they tended to be less connected to obvious and 
concrete circumstances of specific organisations, and moreover, they focused less on 
ultimate purposes and functions. Expectations and prospects became a dominant part of 
financial control systems. These were not centred around organisational circumstances as 
such but were more connected to external forces, upwards and forwards. They were critical 
in many vertical and horizontal processes. Opportunities and alternatives were stimulated 
and favoured without strict boundaries. The time horizon was essential. In particular, 
functions to satisfy were specified more and more, often from a direct utility point of view, 
at the expense of functions of a more general and vague character. Activities were oriented 
towards identified products rather than price-less functions. This was one of strongest trends 
for many decades.  
                                                            
18 Even if my views and concepts are not always consistent with the book Panarchy, I have found it most 
stimulating for my ideas in this part of my book, Present  functions and transformation.     
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For a long time, control systems have had fictitious elements.
19 Group accounting is built 
on the illusion that a parent company has a direct relationship to assets and liabilities in 
subsidiaries, even though this is obviously not the case. Profit centres are regarded as 
independent of central executive units operationally and financially, which is not the case 
either. Products and costs are associated without causal grounds. Fair values in financial 
reporting can be based on opportunities and prices that are not presently considered by the 
specific company and will never be considered. Valuation techniques in corporate finance 
may be based on verbal model markets that will not signify any actual conditions in which 
values-in-exchange appear. Expectations at one point in the time are compared with 
expectations on a later occasion or values based on hypothetical premises, for example risk 
measures with a historical background. Uncertainties are converted into calculable risks. 
Many such elements can be an ingredient of standards that companies have to comply with. 
As a whole, prospects rather than retrospect have more and more become the nature of 
financial control.  
Focus on instruments and the sophistication of instruments provide possibilities for 
progress but also create a potential problem: an over-emphasis on methods and processes in 
relation to underlying purposes. Each primary move towards sophistication soon leads to a 





In the past, public-sector control and private-sector control were mostly regarded as two 
different fields. Furthermore, simplified notions about various mechanisms often served as 
ideological and rhetorical weapons when overall structure and control systems were 
constructed. In the mid-20
th century, the expansion of the public sector in Sweden was 
supported by unrealistic ideas about “people´s” influence on resource allocation in society. 
In a similar way, market liberal ideas at the end of the century included operational, social 
and temporal contexts for resources and their use only to a very limited extent. 
For me, the starting point is functions rather than control methods. In that case, much is to 
be said for a more holistic approach analytically. Economic systems should satisfy the 
functions of large groups of people. These functions are based on common resources to a 
decisive extent and have many interconnections. Activities within the private and public 
sectors are interdependent, especially in the long term, and they aim at human goals that are 
interdependent too. There are pay-driven approaches and function-driven approaches to the 
basic problem. To what extent, and in what way, can these approaches be combined? How 
should pay-driven units be managed? What should be the role of authorities and control 
subjects in relation to pay-driven units? How should tax-financed function-driven units be 
governed?  
The private sector is not financially independent of the public sources. Authorities, based 
on political will and decisions, may occasionally give financial support to threatened 
corporations of significance for the financial system or some important industrial sector. It is 
uncertain when and to whom such support will be given. Nevertheless, financial 
independence and uncertainty are at lower levels than would be the case without this 
possible support; this may have implications for rate-of-return requirements in both vertical 
and horizontal processes.  
                                                            
19 In his book Accounting, Accountants and Accountability, MacIntosh uses the term “hyperreality”. Even if my 
approach is different, I make observations that are similar.   
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Generally speaking, financial control systems for organisations are constructions for 
handling economic scarcity: how functions and visions are related to resources. They are 
instruments for dimensioning, for activity orientation and for efficiency. In the public sector, 
typically, organisations are devoted to certain functions. Funds are allocated for the benefit 
of some area of significance and directives are given.   Various control techniques are used 
to approach function within the public sphere, including pseudo-commercial models and 
assignments to privately-owned organisations. It remains to be seen what actually happens at 
the operational level and what the horizontal effects are.  
Political bodies and the public sector determine the frames of control systems for the 
private sector. In these systems, funds are allocated to organisations by users and buyers for 
the benefit of the use of products. Allocations are also made by financial institutions for the 
benefit of financial return. Investment opportunities differ in terms of operational and 
financial risks. In the private sector, typically, pay-driven organisations develop new 
businesses and products and hopefully they will satisfy functions in the future – it is not 
always clear exactly what these functions will be and whether products will give a financial 
return or not. The forces of units in truly decentralised structures have been one cornerstone 
of economic systems.   
Financial control issues can be discussed in terms of a few basic issues. The horizontal 
issue: what do states and flows in the horizontal line look like?    Some forces are opposed to 
each other in this line. The first is efforts forwards to satisfy a user – and ultimately an end 
consumer. The second is the interests related to organisations. The third is considerations 
backwards. The vertical issue:  what do states and flows in the vertical line look like?  Two 
forces in particular are at work in the vertical controlling process. The first is that current 
functions and renewal are achieved by continuous, permanent organisations. The second is 
the perpetual search by financial principals for new alternatives for future functions and for 
vitality in existing organisations. The reinforcement issue: Vertical processes and horizontal 





The overall economic structure contains many types of organisations: Pay-driven companies 
are growing with potential buyers´ purchasing power as a driving force and they have a 
world-wide impact on product markets and labour markets. National and local companies are 
pay-driven. Function-driven organisations are funded by taxes, primarily within national 
borders. Constellations of pay-driven and function-driven units are common, as well as many 
variants of relations from operational or financial points of view, for both private and public 
activities. Function-driven non-profit units, for example within popular movements, work 
within areas that other organisations do not deal with.   
The basic logic behind pay-driven units is the search for horizontal functions that could be 
satisfied for those who have the capacity and willingness to pay. Big business groups are 
almost borderless. Their preconditions and modes of operation make such an extension a 
natural consequence of powerful ambitions. Many people are concerned, as workers, users of 
output or savers. Only rather rarely are function-driven units borderless. Often their 
existence is based on the fact that certain defined groups should be served or satisfied, for 
example citizens of a nation or a municipality or the members of a non-profit association. 
The horizontal flows of many function-driven units are contingent on continuous 
decisions by allocating units. This is the case for tax-financed activities. In turn, however, 
allotments to them and their financial capacity are conditioned by the development of pay- 
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driven activities in several ways. Not only is funding affected by private income generation. 
Also, pay-driven units normally have better opportunities for selection and improving 
productivity in some real sense. For this reason alone, costs of output tend to increase 
continuously in many function-driven operations.  
Nowadays, a substantial number of organisations are, directly or indirectly, occupied with 
financial allocation systems such as financial markets and tax systems. A large proportion of 
actors in emerging structures and control systems have weaker contacts than before with 
low-level, non-financial horizontal flows. In large organisations, relatively unconditioned 
decentralisation is not common. At the same time, there are obvious difficulties in 
organizing powerful subjects at really high, super-national levels where global problems can 
be addressed. Intermediate levels have grown – larger and larger groups of people and 
organisations that are specialised in administrative, financial, communicative and controlling 
techniques. These have been regarded as extremely important, there have been great 
ambitions to create incentive systems to direct and reinforce their work on a local and time-
bound basis. Traditional control subjects have lost some of their weight, both group 
executives and national leaders. Power has moved upwards – to the representatives of 
owners and super-national bodies, respectively.  
Those who represent an organisation at the top are often professionals or politicians who 
are at distance from most substantial horizontal flows.  Top-level representatives have their 
mandates from unorganised individuals who are at an even greater distance from activities 
tending to disregard the relationships between their various, conflicting interests.  Parties 
may spatially and mentally be far from each other, but ultimately they are mutually 
dependent. Thus, top-level representatives have some interaction with large groups of 
anonymous individuals: voters, consumers or investors. For many pay-driven organisations, 
interaction is strong between vertical principals and customer groups that have purchasing 
power. These organisations aim at target groups with such power and they adjust products 
and costs accordingly: for what and how much do they believe customers are willing to pay? 
Functions-driven organisations should serve some specific group, for example citizens of a 
nation. Often this does not prevent them from defining target groups within that frame, even 
if it has no substantial effect on payments. In part, needs are humanitarian. Output must be 





The structural state and control instruments of each organisation at a certain point of time 
have been shaped over a number of previous years. They include some instant processes and 
output, some modes of operations and some inbuilt values. Horizontal relations are critical. 
To what extent is an organisation influenced by or influencing actors backwards? To what 
extent is it influenced by or influencing actors forwards?  The nature of its financial function 
has been shaped over the years. To what extent does the organisation have the capacity to 
take care of the financial effects of operational variations? To what extent is it dependent on 
financial markets and outside allocating systems and their variations? At various vertical 
levels, measures can be taken. Old financial control instruments can be modified and new 
ones can be introduced. In practice, different kinds of system components and changes are 
available at different vertical levels. They may have an impact on operations and financial 
functions, with various time lags, and be strong or weak. 
The degree of sensitiveness to external horizontal forces is important. Within both the 
public and the private sectors much attention is paid in some way or another to certain  
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functions and certain groups – the targeted areas of significance. Control systems, even in 
the public sector, may mediate external opinions, not least about output. This may cause 
minor and frequent modifications of functions and products, contributing to areas of 
significance that have already attracted considerable efforts. Product differentiation will 
increase within narrow frames. Profound moves in functions, however, are not stimulated 
easily this way. The types of boundaries of an organisation in the horizontal chain have 
consequences for how sensitive it is to changes in various external forces. Also, the amount, 
form and application of targets and limitations must be weighed against room for adaptive 
behaviour. 
Some stability is desirable as well as some influence on other horizontal parties – 
avoiding immobility in relation to all the surrounding parties. On the other hand, influences 
from outside are essential for developing long-term functions. Sticking to a financial control 
system, without an adaptive mind, may be an obstacle to dynamic forces. Often, profound 
moves call for room for action and a self-sustained view on problems. However, 
relationships are not simple. Some stability is needed for current functions. Prospects and 
opportunities for the future mean instability in some respects and striving for stability in 
others.  
For individual organisations, long-term financial decoupling is impossible. Uncertainties 
and risks are determined partly by discretionary inside decisions and partly by external 
events. Exposure to these operational and financial risks and uncertainties, and how they are 
handled, is critical from the organisation´s point of view.  
The hierarchy above operational activities manages all issues concerning stability and 
change. The vulnerability of the organisation as such may constitute a varying concern. The 
background differs: what events actors at different levels are in touch with, what bases of 
knowledge they have and what alternatives they consider. Will upper levels, perhaps, focus 
on vertical and horizontal procedures and on repeated structural changes, rather than on 
horizontal activities as such? What will be supported and what will be prevented? Lower 
levels will have a stronger focus on developing these activities and improvements from that 
point of view. They have no immediate reason for considering any other functions and 
visions. Introducing market values and approximate equivalents in financial accounts 
represents a step in this perspective. The penetration of transformation processes within the 
existing structures of an organisation is not primarily supported, rather some unspecified 
alternative use. 
Organisational behaviour is a systematic, continuous force. Each organisation has its own 
separate perspective. Most of them are intensely driven and are supported by control systems 
that are deeply rooted in their separate financial conditions. Top-level executives in 
particular are expected to be, and most of them are, heavily engaged in their limited tasks 
from their point of view. Partitioning is combined with force. Often it is not primarily a 
question whether there is sub-optimization in relation to a defined entirety; it could rather be 
described as local and time-bound optimization in relation to partly uncertain and only partly 
defined areas of significance. 
Control systems and measurements are fragile in relation to most problems but are 
applied in a mode of energetic and forceful focus on explicit measures, targets, limits and 
processes of the separate unit that they represent. An intense hands-on mentality, sometimes 
at a distance, at high speed within narrow boundaries, has become common. Only marginally 
are wider repercussions parts of an agenda. Separate perspectives are often strong and time 
horizons relatively short. Sometimes attention is attached to one single aspect, measure and 
target, or at least only a few, that is central to this perspective, functioning from a  
52 
 
communicational point of view. All these factors may be regarded as obstacles to adaptive 
behaviour. 
Professional ideals include explicit quantified measures, targets and limits as well as 
qualitative norms and rules of processes. Now and then, establishing rules of processes is a 
way of handling conflicts of interest. Instead of setting a certain limit, a procedure is 
prescribed. The question is how instrumental such process rules are for ultimate functions. 
Some extensive regulations of processes may not be instrumental for a material, experiential 
or operational function. Rather they may express ideals within some professional sphere. 
They represent a high degree of instrumentalism.  On the other hand, being able to adapt, 
rather than sticking to certain targets and limits, may be a critical quality, although rules of 





The handling of organisations – with their control subjects at different levels – has 





There is no easily located responsibility for an economic system in its widest sense; self-
organisation takes place to an essential extent. Many parties meet each other and are 
involved. Some organisations influence parts of events. National and super-national organs 
may institute laws that are important at certain points. Authorities can also affect 
developments through allotments and directives, as well as through fiscal and monetary 
policies. Codes of conduct are defined for certain relations. Financial reporting bodies set 
standards. National supervisory boards can take measures when an organisation does not 
comply with general rules. To some extent, the contents and norms of public information 
systems emerge in close relation to business transaction activities and information 
technology opportunities, rather than being determined by any formal control subject. This 
type of information requirements basically supports certain kinds of local and time-bound 
behaviour and may change in character over time. Authorities at a national or multinational 
level can become operative actors when some essential part of the structure is threatened.  
It is difficult to define the state and nature of the widest systems, including uncertainties. 
Moreover, it is a dominating fact that no one can be said to represent an obvious entirety and 
overall interest, irrespective of separate interests. Nevertheless, formal and informal control 
subjects exist – special organisations within the public or private sphere and the mass media 
that in fact play a controlling role. They cover some control objects and/or some more or less 
well-defined economic system. Some of them, such as standard setters within various fields, 
are established to fulfil a certain control function. They prescribe rules for measures, targets 
and processes, they monitor object activities and some of them allocate resources. Others, 
such as the mass media, are surveying processes and effects. They may themselves be 
working within a system where competition explicitly prevails in various respects.   
Control subjects have their targeted areas of significance. But there are also residual 
areas: functions and dysfunctions, in general or for certain groups, that are affected when 
other aspects are targeted. Uncertainty and lack of visibility is fundamental for critical 
relationships in and around most organisations. For this simple reason, notions of  
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transparency and perfect information are not very natural reference points when control 






Nations represent certain economic systems and have controlling subjects, ultimately the 
people as such, parliament, government and various authorities. Traditionally, national 
bodies are strong control subjects. They reallocate funds. They should satisfy functions, 
some of great urgency and growing, with national taxes as their main financial source. For 
nations, continuous adaptation is a key issue. Financial policy and monetary policy are two 
major tools. In the epoch around the year 2000, for some nations like Sweden, financial 
policy was based on strict expenditure limits and of strict avoidance of budgetary deficits. 
Control through monetary policy was emphasized. Strict targets, which were intensely 
applied, rather than adaptive behaviour in broad terms, were the main line.  
Pay-driven units work within an infrastructure that political bodies have strongly 
contributed to, and they cannot do without that structure.  From society´s point of view, the 
legitimacy of pay-driven units is based on how they make contributions in horizontal 
processes or vertical processes. Operational regulations are required when outcome is urgent 
for large groups of citizens. Standards for horizontal states and processes are set, for instance 
within the environmental field and the labour market. Behaviour in certain fields is checked 
with regard to societal vulnerability and potential damage by interruptions in horizontal 
processes. Protection against such interruptions is a long-term issue, and financial 
independence, roles, risks and rewards of pay-driven organisations may be judged from that 
perspective. In interconnected systems, interruptions are probable but perhaps only at long 
intervals. Thus, the availability of funds from political sources is a last resort that is used for 
some organisations on few occasions.  
At the end of the 20
th century and in the first years of the 21
st century, the structure of 
pay-driven units was transforming towards a more global and multinational system. Products 
and marketing and distribution procedures that are effective from a communication point of 
view are spread over the world. Not only pure production but also units for administrative 
work, development activities and executive functions are movable. The same happens to 
financial business activities such as trading on stock exchanges. For many large companies, 
vertical procedures extend upwards to internationally traded shares. Group managers are 
located in relatively few countries with subsidiaries in many other countries. Naturally, there 
is one perspective on these subsidiaries in the purely vertical line and another perspective 
from a national point of view. Nations have their share of horizontal flows within all 
international organisations, together with the corresponding taxable income.     
The infrastructure and restrictions for pay-driven organisation, horizontally and vertically, 
are to an increasing extent a concern of super-national or international bodies. In the public 
sphere, a super-national level is above every national level. Nations do not control subjects 
to the same extent as before; rather they too are controlled as a part of a greater collective. At 
                                                            
20 The opposite view is apparently more common in financial accounting literature. See, for example, Barth & 
Schipper,  Financial Reporting Transparency. They propose a definition with representational and users´ 
perspectives: “the extent to which financial reports reveal an entity´s underlying economics in a way that is 
readily understandable by those using the financial reports”. Barth & Schipper do not discuss conflicts of 
interest, nor the distance problem or any contextual problems. They argue that transparency is “a worthy goal”, 
because the cost of capital tends to be reduced.  
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the super-national level, there are temporary projects and permanent, function-driven 
organisations that are exposed to general mechanisms but they have extra complexity due to 






What may be regarded as an economic system does not necessarily have particular 
controlling subjects, at least not in the same sense as a financial entity. Relationships are 
broader. Perspectives are different. Specific areas of significance are given emphasis, and 
interested parties may attach different weight to them. What is an external effect for a 
financial unit now becomes an endogenous phenomenon. For example, risks that are carried 
over to consumers can be regarded as external or not, dependent on the boundaries of the 
system. A typical feature of many of these greater systems is that boundaries are not obvious 
and uncertainties prevail about the functioning. Local and time-bound optimization for a 
smaller system may be valuable, but it also represents a potential problem.  
Both in practice and in theory, inter-organisational control and networks are important 
phenomena. Interaction between organisations horizontal-wise may be a key issue, 
irrespective of organisational boundaries. From that point of view, the division of financial 
functions among different organisations may prove to be an obstacle. After all, each 
organisation has its own financial perspective. In addition, financial interconnections may 
complicate. Some financial organisations are sensitive to operational and financial 
uncertainties in non-financial organisations. Some are sensitive to operational and financial 
uncertainties in other financial organisations, and to variations and shifts in assets and 
funding markets or allocating system, which may or may not be connected to the 
development of non-financial companies. The functioning of financial markets and 
allocating systems is in turn decisive for uncertainties about everything, including the 
development of values-in-exchange of assets and public transfers of funds. Adaptive 
capability in the whole interconnected system is vital. The financial capacity of each 
organisation, including the ability to handle external disturbances, is a tool against 
vulnerability in such systems. During the second half of the 20
th century, control systems 
became less and less oriented towards the self-sustainability of individual organisations. A 
rather great vulnerability in financial institutions, with possible long-term occurrence, was 
also accepted through rules. 
In this perspective, too, introducing market values and approximate equivalents in 
financial accounts represents an essential move for both financial and non-financial 
organisations. Such measures will show a more volatile world than traditional measures. 
This raises questions such as: How volatile are signified events fundamentally? What effects 
will signifiers induce?  Predictions of market values require not only a view on fundamental 
processes, irrespective of market development. People also have to judge how prices will 
interact, irrespective of specific fundamental intentions with an asset or a liability. Thus, 
interdependence between observable values will be supported. Volatility will increase, 
sometimes in terms of signified market-related events and beyond this also in terms of 
signifiers without any corresponding movements in underlying activities. Market values and 
approximate equivalents will function better in a period of rising prices than in a period of 








Financial control systems raise basic issues about equality. One fundamental idea might 
concern instrumentality. Those who contribute to the material, experiential and financial 
functions of others within a certain group should be rewarded. Personal capability and 
performance are decisive. This is the basic concept, even if constructing incentive systems 
on this basis will be exceedingly difficult. Another fundamental idea might be to provide 
what is needed for certain material, experiential or financial functions. Equality in such 
terms, or minimum levels, is the governing principle. Historically, nations have been obvious 
reference points in this respect. Partitioning is a possible strategy for wealthy people and 
nations, at least in the short term, but on the other hand dependencies evolve over time. In 
the end, everybody can be affected by the fact that some groups are not part of a social and 
economic context and exist where welfare and values are not shared.  
Financial control systems tend to make the distribution of wealth uneven. Not least the 
restructuring of economic systems makes this issue urgent. Transformation, development 
and the need for future functions bring opportunities and risks. To what extent should and 
could the protection of individual functions be an area for arrangements of individual finance 
functions? Or should it be approached by collective funding through an organisation that will 





For the entire horizontal process, output must be viewed in relation to sacrifice and to input 
backwards in the chains, reaching as far back as natural resources and working condition at 
various stages. Usually, forward-driving forces in the horizontal line form a basic logic of 
control procedures. Control systems during the first years of the 21
st century focused on 
separate interests and especially supported certain near functions forwards. This type of 
systems is not ideal for managing problems that basically concern everybody and have long-
term character, such as managing natural resources. Many variables have to be handled 
simultaneously. Visible effects appear by and by, but after a time very tangibly; some 
resources that are not renewable are consumed gradually.
21 States and ongoing processes will 
remain unknown in essential respects. Fundamentally, there is no alternative. The aim of 
control is not products that are traded to satisfy human needs and desires but rather physical 
and biological states and processes that go on without any intentional meaning. Effects hurt 
the physical and biological environment, which ultimately is the foundation for everybody. 
Thus, this is not a concern for certain traditionally defined groups, even if various such 
groups may be affected to varying degrees. 
                                                            
21 One extraordinarily early book about environmental issues was published in 1864, Man and nature, by 
George P. Marsh. The very existence of this book with its observations illustrates much of the long-range 





As in pay-driven organisations, all controlling subjects partly focus on separate and 
professional interests. All controlling organisations do, including authorities and the mass 
media. Often, control bodies are parts of a complicated vertical and horizontal structure, and 
this is the case even more when problems and organisations extend across national borders. 
Operative, standard setting and supervisory authorities within the public sphere are not 
exempted from general mechanisms that any organisation meets. Operational regulations, 
surveillance and financial support are handled in function-driven organisations that are 
exposed to many of the same forces as most tax-financed units. Thus, also for the design and 
evolution of control and surveillance systems as such, target-oriented driving forces are 
essential and processes go on that have many similarities with any user-oriented process, 
whether commercial or not. Everybody tends to focus on the articulate vertical and 
horizontal interests around them, often, but not necessarily, to be in conformity with the 
surrounding actors. 
One important question is the extent to which control bodies pronounce standards that are 
based on their own broad basis, and to what extent their position reflects the views of outside 
actors. For example, accounting standard setters may have the view that financial reporting 
should be useful for a certain group like analysts, and they may try to capture analysts´ 
views. This is only one way of reproducing one type of separate views at one point in time, 
rather than trying to identify what would be functional for the economic system in a broader 
and longer perspective. It is not necessarily a good idea to let a standard setter construct 
accounting rules with the needs of “decision-makers” as the main guide line. If this ambition 
is fulfilled, the current views of such decision-makers will be built into the control system, 
which does not mean that the system will be appropriate for future situations of a very 
different character. Application problems are obvious for systems that are not very robust, 
which is the case with many rules based on predictions. Implied effects may also appear in 
the long run, such as the distribution of power among owners, boards and central executives.  
Each control subject has a distance to its control objects. Professional story-telling occurs 
at a distance for a public at an even greater distance. Promises are emphasized and examined. 
High vertical levels have been emphasized more and more. Top representatives who are at 
some distance from fundamental horizontal processes communicate with media that are also 
at a distance, which in turn communicate with recipients that are at an even greater distance. 
Of course, there is information beyond the rhetorical value but these phenomena limit the 
possibility of transparency in any deep sense. Distance is also significant for formal 
supervisory processes and media reporting about them. Supervisory bodies observe at a 
distance – often then these boards have to evaluate techniques for judging future events, 
rather than any series of actual real-world events. They have to communicate through mass 
media. What they report may be distorted by superficial story-telling structures that are more 
appropriate for intermediaries and media recipients than other more specific and complicated 
pictures. General terms like “risks” with ambiguous meanings are pivotal.  
Professional story-telling has led, perhaps implicitly, to certain views on the vertical 
relations of organisations. Concerning the private sector, the responsibilities of the board are 
often focused and widened downwards, which has repercussions on working conditions at 
lower levels. Processes at different vertical levels are interrelated and the bases for actions 
are different. Yet, controllability issues are not addressed. Often, laws and rules are 
determined after public processes that require immediate action based on vague grounds. The  
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focus is on the highest organisational levels, without any deep insight into other internal 
processes. Monitoring is at a distance. With this starting point, public rules are modified, 
concentrating on high-level responsibilities without taking total internal processes into 
account. From a systems point of view, sanctions are primarily symbolic. Organisations and 
systems become questionably equipped to meet future disturbances.  
Any formal controlling body, public or private, tends to represent a local and time-bound 
perspective and supports such actions of every object organisation. Designing a control 
system in a technical sense means partitioning. Areas of significance from a broader 
system´s point of view are not considered. This may be natural from a professional point of 
view, but the effects of norms can be far-reaching and may include aspects that norm setters 
would regard as irrelevant for them. Rules and procedures for determining the rules may 
cause inconveniences for greater systems of an uncertain and less well-defined nature. This 
may occur without any loud and visible signs appearing immediately, or without being in 
immediate conflict with many interests, perhaps not even represented in the body. Systems 
complexity means that part-driven and far-going norm setting, on the conditions of a few 





Control systems have a basic instrumental logic in relations to human needs and desires. 
However, they may be instrumental with regard to one subject or system but not to another. 
In addition, problems that need to be solved, control systems design and modes of 
application may change over time. Scarcity, risks and tensions are intrinsic in the economic 
system. Financial control systems for organisation must be designed and evaluated with this 
in mind. How can this system and other organisational arrangements really affect present and 
future functions? To what extent are horizontal events controllable? Who, at what vertical 
levels, can exert control and how? 
Judging functions and visions and their relationships with resources is a complex task, 
especially for extensive social systems, relatively ungraspable and associated with 
uncertainties that are conceived differently by different parties. Problems that include natural 
resources are even more difficult to depict. Actually, uncertainty prevails about the character 
of states and processes of nature. Thus, the abilities of a control system can often not be 
referred to a defined entirety, but rather to a set of areas of significance to which different 
parties attach different weight. These areas may be difficult to define. To an essential extent, 
states and processes are debatable and debated.  
For most part, ultimate control subjects are weak on their own and full of contradictions. 
Nevertheless, influence and expectations have moved upwards and forwards, at least 
rhetorically. Realistic controllability is not a major concern. Conventions and descriptions 
beyond inter-subjective rigour, models without empirical connections to signified real-world 
phenomena, control at a distance, fragile measures, instrumentalism, targets and predictions, 
partitioning – all are necessary and essentially desirable to some extent, as possibly also are 
the dreams of leaders who arouse enthusiasm in people. But they all also represent the 
possible degeneration of instrumentality, especially if control systems are applied with 
intensive force. 
Questions about pro-active and targeted behaviour, present functions, future 
improvements, exposure to risk and adaptive capacity could be raised for a number of 
subjects and major systems: individuals, organisations, nations, international systems, global 
systems. Financial flows show a complex and interdependent pattern: surpluses and deficits  
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for organisations, wages, pensions and capital items for individuals, savings, loans, taxes and 
so on. The position of various parts in an interconnected system, especially their degree of 
autonomy, is a fundamental aspect – for the sake of this party and for larger systems.  
For individual organisations, the main issue is how the control system is related to the 
entire vertical, horizontal and diagonal processes. Basically, everybody has to make 
decisions about how to connect to vertical processes upwards and external norms, how to 
capture and influence horizontal flows, what kind of information is useful from his or her 
own standpoint and how to influence downwards. Top representatives of an organisation 
have a special position. On behalf of the organisation, they have to comply with certain rules 
from outside. For internal systems, they may connect strongly to these rules or choose a 
more self-sustained approach. Often, control systems components are not prescribed but are 
in fashion at the time – naturally, each organisation can make its own choice. Changes of 
control systems may be judged in relation to other forces that are affecting outcome, 
development and adaptive capability. Frequency of changes is a special matter. Often, 
several layers of control systems of different epochs are at work simultaneously.     
Controlling wide systems, such as international financial systems, means a mix of control 
subjects, relationships between subject and control objects and various rules with various 
kinds of measures, targets and processes described. The combination of components is 
critical, involving control subjects and varying vertical levels of the objects, not excluding 
the importance of operational levels, which are near the basic, horizontal observations and 
perhaps have the capability of immediate adaptive behaviour. It is possible that strong 
control from high organisational levels is not feasible. Uncertainty is unavoidable, and in 
some ways instability is even productive for general development. Control systems may be 
constructed with this in mind. Then, measures, targets and processes should not be designed 
in detail, as if that would take care of uncertainties. This is in conflict with the view that 
“risk” problems should be solved by placing more formal responsibility at the highest 
representative level of large organisations.  
An economic system with many areas of significance requires many aspects to be 
considered simultaneously, on a continuous basis and on urgent occasions. Lack of balance 
and robustness is a problem, especially in the long term. Strong emphasis on a few 
measurable variables in current activities creates biases, as do strong central regulations from 
a narrow perspective. Linking between different perspectives is needed. Pay-driven and 
function-driven approaches at various organisational levels should be combined with 
influence from national and super-national authorities, based on an empirical view on what 
authorities do and can do. 
Forceful linking between different sub-processes is a key issue for control systems that 
are instrumental for sustainable futures. Both pay-driven and function-driven activities are 
necessary if new technology is to emerge. Collective funding is required and must be 
coordinated. Function-driven organisations are needed because the basic issue is problem-
solving for comprehensive processes and states of nature, rather than supplying products and 
systems in a traditional sense. The simultaneous handling of many interdependent variables 
does not allow such decentralized forms of control that essentially characterized the 
emergence of the welfare during the 20
th century. 
At every point in time, each individual, with her and his different interests in relation to 
many organisations, can take a look at her/his present state, future prospects and 
vulnerability, from a financial point of view as well. Individuals have to find their way in the 
social, local and professional life, they have their level of consumption and they need to earn 
a living and to be included in savings schemes. They are or can make themselves rather  
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independent of how circumstances around them change or they may be strongly exposed to 





It cannot be ignored during the early 21
st century that among accounting researchers there is 
growing interest in the relationships between “real world problems” and academic research – 
perhaps even a questioning attitude. Most research efforts have a specific and rather limited 
perspective – partitioning is common in research, too. Insights may no doubt be gained 
within such frames. However, clarifying perspectives and approaching integrative, linking 
issues are important strategies, if complicated real-world problems should be based on social 
research. Conventions and models beyond inter-subjective empirical rigour need to be 
approached in an analytical spirit; the actual, current roles of researchers often seem to be 
supporting and inventing new conventions and models.  
Often, explicit conclusions are too far-reaching, especially if they are transformed into 
something that is communicable to larger audiences. Social research, like other informational 
activities, includes story-telling exercised by a profession in relation to target groups in 
lecture rooms, media of various kinds – including academic journals – and the world of 
practical conduct. At abstract levels, the everyday logic of ordinary people sometimes 
coincides with simplifications within narrow professional frames, especially if such 
professional views are transformed into a public form and underline popular concepts that 
have strong rhetorical power, like “greed” and “transparency”.  
Complexity, rather than over-relativistic simplicity, should be a line for descriptions in 
social research, especially with respect to long-term effects. In many ways, research is 
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